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Unauthorized Practice and Pro Se Divorce
Introduction
The widespread adoption of no-fault divorce statutes' has been ac-
companied by the emergence of published kits and services designed
to facilitate pro se marital dissolution.2 In many jurisdictions, how-
ever, the availability of inexpensive printed or personalized assistance 3
has been severely limited by bar-initiated litigation under statutes
proscribing the unauthorized practice of law.4 As a result, the recent
demise of the fault-based system has removed the doctrinal but not
the fiscal impediments to uncontested dissolution.
This Project evaluates the justifications for invoking unauthorized
practice prohibitions in the context of pro se divorce. Part I discusses
the impetus for divorce kits and services and describes the ensuing
unauthorized practice litigation. Part II reviews the arguments mar-
shaled in decisions enjoining the distribution of kits and the provision
of personalized assistance, and tests the empirical validity of these
arguments. Principal data sources are 331 uncontested divorce files
from two Connecticut counties, questionnaires completed by 106
Connecticut attorneys, and telephone interviews with 99 lawyer-as-
sisted divorce plaintiffs and 93 "do-it-yourself" divorce kit purchasers.
This information is organized to isolate and illumine the discrete
functions performed by lawyers in uncontested divorce actions. The
Project concludes that the recent unauthorized practice injunctions
have been based on assumptions which are not supported by the as-
sembled data.
There may be justifications for the lawyer monopoly beyond those
proffered in unauthorized practice litigation. In particular, Connecti-
cut divorce lawyers who completed the Project questionnaire adverted
to their negotiating and personal counseling functions. Part III em-
1. Only Illinois, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota retain exclusively fault grounds for
divorce. In other jurisdictions, proof of voluntary separation or marital breakdown will
suffice for a dissolution decree. For a complete listing of statutory requirements for
dissolution in all states, see Freed, Grounds for Divorce in the American Jurisdictions, 8
F,Rr. L.Q. 401 (1973). Since the publication of that compendium, Massachusetts and
Mississippi have modified their divorce statutes by introducing no-fault grounds. MASS.
ANN. L.%ws, ch. 208, § IA (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1975) (irretrievable breakdown); Miss.
Senate Bill No. 20-74, § 1 (1976) (irreconcilable differences) (on file with Yale Law
Journal).
2. A list of kits and services which have been available at some point in 14 states
appears in Appendix 1.
3. In some jurisdictions, whether or not assistance is "personalized," i.e., whether the
agents of lay services personally assist customers, has proved a critical factor in the as-
signment of unauthorized practice liability. See pp. 112-13 infra.
4. See Appendix 1.
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ploys data from attorney questionnaires and client interviews to
critique these aspects of the attorney's role.
In Part IV the Project examines the adverse consequences of the
present restrictions on lay divorce services. A fifth and final section
summarizes the public policy considerations militating against the
perpetuation of the lawyer monopoly over the procedural aspects of
uncontested marital dissolution.
I. The Emergence of Pro Se Divorce Aids
and the Response of the Bar
Traditionally, lawyers have been virtually indispensable agents in
the formal dissolution of marriages. Prior to 1967, couples seeking a
divorce were generally obliged to prove in court that one spouse's mis-
conduct or abnormality had destroyed the viability of the marital
relationship.5 Within this '"fault"-imbued context, attorney functions
included preparing the forms required for entry of a decree of divorce,
compiling evidence of culpability and presenting it at trial," and
capitalizing on the relevance of misconduct to achieve greater bargain-
ing leverage in negotiations over financial and parental matters.
7
5. Common statutory grounds included adultery, physical or mental cruelty, con-
viction of certain crimes, habitual intemperance, insanity, and impotence. For a dis-
cussion of the requirements in various jurisdictions, see Wadlington, Divorce Without
Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv. 32 (1966). By 1968, 22 states also permitted dis-
solution for couples who had lived apart for some prescribed statutory interval ranging
from one to 10 years. M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE Lw 314
& n.5 (1972). Given the extended mandatory separation periods, these provisions did not
displace traditional fault grounds. As the Reporter for the Committee on Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Laws of the Commission on Uniform State Laws observed: "So
long as a perjured or collusive, fault-based divorce is an alternative, many couples will
want to take advantage of the more rapid alternative, and lawyers will find it difficult
to resist such pressures.- R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 53 (1969).
6. For a description of the attorney's role in superintending courtroom attributions
of guilt, see R. FELDER, DIVORCE 124-200 (1971); M. VIRTUE, FAMILY CASES IN COURT 27-29,
89-91 (1956); and Westman, The Myth of the Uncontested Divorce, 41 FL.. B.J. 304,
306-08 (1967). Cf. 1 L. MARSHALL & G. MAY, THE DIVORCE COURT 170-94 (1932) (transcripts
of court testimony adduced to establish fault). However, the distasteful necessity of
proving marital misconduct at a full dress public hearing was to some extent avoidable.
Attorneys representing affluent parties frequently referred their clients to jurisdictions
with minimal residency and lax evidentiary requirements (e.g., Nevada and Mexico). N.
BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES 152-72 (1962).
It was estimated in the mid-1960s that migratory divorces accounted for 11% of annual
American dissolutions. Drinan, What are the Rights of the Involuntary Divorcee? Re-
flections on Divisible Divorce, 53 Ky. L.J. 209, 213 (1965).
7. Fault grounds were susceptible to manipulative and extortionary use. For revealing,
albeit popularized accounts, see D. CANTOR, ESCAPE FROM MARRIAGE 39-62 (1971); R.
FELDER, supra note 6, at 13-20, 227 (1971); R. KAHN & L. KAHN, THE DIVORCE LAWYER'S
CASmOOK 91-93 (1972); S. ROSENBLV-r, THE DIVORCE RACKET 20-23, 50-51 (1969); N.
SHERESKY &. M. MANNES, UNCOUPLING 53-93 (1972); Phillips, Mental Hygiene, Divorce, and
the Law, 3 J. FAt. L. 63, 65, 69-70 (1963).
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By the end of the 1960s, there was a gTrowing consensus among
scholars and practitioners that fault-based divorce was an irrational
and unnecessarily demeaning process.8 Critics maintained that the
adjudication of guilt increased acrimony between spouses,9 encouraged
the use of children as bargaining pawns, 10 created ethical tensions for
the bench and bar," and eroded respect for the law generally.12 Be-
tween 1967 and 1976, 47 states effectively removed fault impediments
to dissolution by providing as gTounds for divorce such criteria as
incompatibility, irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, or a volun-
tary separation of short duration.13
S. See, e.g., M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 406; Goldstein & Gitter, On Abolition of
Grounds for Divorce: A Model Statute & Commentary, 3 FA,,. L.Q. 75, 79-81 (1969);
Note, Untying the Knot: The Cause and Patterns of Divorce Reform, 57 CORNELL L.
REV. 619, 653-54 (1972).
This consensus was echoed in the analysis prepared by the Reporter for the Com-
mittee on Uniform Marriage and Divorce Laws. R. LEVY, supra note 5, at 9, 43-44, 52.
The Committee had been appointed in 1966 by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws to draft a model marriage and divorce code. The Committee
ultimately recommended that all the traditional fault grounds for divorce be replaced by
a single no-fault criterion: irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. UNIFORM MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCe Acr § 302, reprinted in 18 S.D. L. REv. 680, 683 (1973).
Although the model code adopted by the Commission was never endorsed by the ABA,
see note 13 infra, its report and attendant reverberations in legal journals generated
sentiment for the reforms that occurred between 1967 and 1976.
9. See sources cited in note 7 supra.
10. See, e.g., M. VIRTUr, supra note 6, at 44; Kay & Phillips, Poverty and the Law of
Child Custody, 54 CALIr. L. REV. 717, 740 (1966).
11. Matrimonial lawyers frequently faced an irreconcilable conflict between the ex-
pectations of their clients (who wanted a divorce whether or not they had a legally
cognizable ground) and the canons of their profession (which proscribed advancement of
perjurious or collusive claims). H. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES 30-32
(1963). For instance, under New York legislation that made adultery the sole ground for
divorce until 1966, the temptation to conjure up "the familiar blonde in black silk
pyjamas" was often irresistible. Drinker, Problems of Professional Ethics in Matrimonial
Litigation, 66 H.ARV. L. REV. 443, 448 (1953). See also W. GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIE
IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY 285-86 (1954) (quoting report of grand jury investiga-
tion which, after examining 600 files and 1500 witnesses, concluded that "fraud, perjury,
collusion and connivance pervade matrimonial actions of every type"); N.Y. Herald
Tribune, Oct. 1, 1965, at 19, col. I (report of testimony of state supreme court Justice
Meier Steinbrink before state legislative committee regarding "farcical" situation which
confronted matrimonial bench).
12. Because the law required that hearings be staged as adversarial clashes even when
the parties were in agreement, the court was left
presiding over a contest which is no contest at all . . . and made to take part in a
solemn if silly comic-melodrama, impatiently acted out as superficially and rapidly
as possible by the participants. Such a performance is beneath the dignity of the
American court, and it cheapens not only the tribunal but the members of the
profession who are also involved in the ceremony.
M. VIR-UE, supra note 6, at 230. See also M. PLoscowE, THE TRUTH ABOUT DIVORCE 247-50
(1955); Wadlington, supra note 5, at 32-35.
13. Statutory grounds for dissolution in these states are outlined in note I supra and
sources cited therein. "Irretrievable breakdown" was the formulation urged by the
Commission on Uniform State Laws. See note 8 supra. The definition and justiciability of
this proposed no-fault criterion were points of contention between the Committee on
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Laws and the ABA's Family Law Section. The Uniform
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Although in some jurisdictions certain procedural vestiges of the
adversarial process were retained,1 4 no-fault legislation signaled a
diminished role for attorneys in uncontested divorces. Reforms
eliminating the need to adduce evidence of marital offenses in court,
accompanied in some states by a simplification of pleadings, reduced
the necessity for legal guidance in dissolution actions.Ia And, as some
members of the bar had predicted,', attempts to oust attorneys from
certain aspects of the divorce process soon followed.' 7
Support for pro se representation emerged from an inchoate alliance
Commission generally seeks ABA approval before lobbying for a particular model act.
The Family Law Section was responsible for evaluating the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act fox the ABA; it recommended against ABA ratification in 1970. The bar's
refusal to ratify represented the first rejection of a Commission proposal since the
Commission's founding in 1892. Foster, Divorce Reform and the Uniform Act, 7 FAst.
L.Q. 179, 185 n.33 (1973).
After the defeat of the Act, a joint committee of ABA and Commission representatives
was appointed to work out a compromise proposal. As amended by that committee, § 305
of the Uniform Act defined irretrievable breakdown as "no reasonable prospect of
reconciliation," and mandated entry of a decree where both parties stated under oath
that the marriage was irretrievably broken or where one party so stated and the other
did not deny it. Id. at 194. The new proposal was still unacceptable to the Family Law
Section. Henry Foster, Jr., co-chairman of the Section's research committee, opined that
what the Commission reporters "really favored [was] administrative divorce upon
request." Id. at 186. See also Podell, The Case for Revision of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, 7 FAM. L.Q. 169, 171-72 (1973). The ABA again refused to ratify the Act in
1972, Foster, supra at 187, and proposed a counterdraft the same year, Proposed Revised
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (Submitted by ABA Family Law Section), 7 Fm.
L.Q. 135 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Act]. A revised version of the Uniform
Act was finally adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in February 1974. House of
Delegates Acts on Group Legal Services, Shield Legislation, Court Organization Standards,
and Uniform Divorce, 60 A.B.A.J. 446, 451 (1974).
14. A complaint, service by sheriff, and hearing in court are still required in
Connecticut and other no-fault jurisdictions. See pp. 123-27 & note 78 infra.
15. In cases where probative requirements could be satisfied by an attestation of
separation for the statutory period or a stipulation of irretrievable breakdown, the need
for counsel was obviously reduced both before and during "trial." In the course of re-
form, a number of states also streamlined the mechaiics of pleading. The impact in
California was especially dramatic. A survey of court files in Alameda County from
February 24 to April 9, 1971, revealed that six percent of the petitions were pro se, as
compared with .5% in 1969 before the no-fault ground and procedural reforms were
instituted. Goddard, A Report on California's New Divorce Law: Progress and Problems,
6 FAM. L.Q. 405, 413 (1972). For data on the volume of pro se dissolutions in several
states, including California, see note 25 infra. For further discussion of procedural
requirements in no-fault divorce jurisdictions, see pp. 123-29 infra.
16. Attorney comments reported in M. WHEELER, No FALLT DivoiicE 117-30 (19741)
suggest that an appreciable segment of the bar equated the arrival of no-fault legislation
with a decline in legal fees. C. Mentrowski, Associate Dean of the Marquette Law School,
chided reformers in the Family Law Section: "Behind it all, )ou can't see that it's really
,no lawyer'. Whether it's no-fault insurance law or administrative probate or now no
fault divorce, you're all advocating your own demise." Id. at 120. S. Schoonmaker, Chair-
man of the Connecticut Bar Association's Family Law Section, reported opposition to
statutory reform from practitioners who charged several hundred dollars for divorcing
couples of modest means. These lawyers felt that no-fault would "dry lip this business"
by permitting potential clients to divorce themselves. Id. at 123, 124.
17. See Appendix 1.
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of feminists,' 8 family law reformers, 19 consumer activists,2 0 and en-
trepreneurs.2 1 Receptivity to this option has undoubtedly been height-
ened by recent well-publicized assaults on the bar's protective pricing
practices. 22 As these monopolistic restrictions began to appear as a
suspect rather than immutable characteristic of the legal profession,
the climate for pro se dissolution grew more favorable. And in at least
14 states a market developed for do-it-yourself divorce kits and
services.
23
Assistance for pro se litigants has taken the form of published kits
and personalized assistance in document preparation, tanging in price
from $3 to $180.24 Typically kits have contained samples of legal forms
necessary to secure a decree of marital dissolution, together with in-
structions on how to complete them. Direct personal advice and
18. Feminists who have developed kits or clinics variously envision pro se divorce as
providing an alternative to "outrageous". legal fees, WOMEN IN TRANSITION, INC., WOMEN'S
SURVIVAL MANUAL: A FEMINIsT HAND3OOR ON SEPARATION AND DIVORCE 45 (1973); a means
of counteracting women's sense of incompetence and dependence, WoMIEN's LEGAL CENTER
OF SAN FRANCISCO, GETTING OUT: A COLLECTIVE EXPERIENCE IN SELF-HELP DIVORCE 3
(1974); and an occasion for encouraging women to question culturally conditioned role
patterns. Id. at 13 (discussion of Seattle Women's Divorce Cooperative).
19. Nathaniel Denman, the founder of Family Law Reform, Inc. (Cambridge, Mass.),
believes that divorce attorneys exhibit bias against men and extort unconscionable fees,
based not on the time expended but on what the traffic will bear. The organization en-
courages individuals to proceed pro se and lobbies for changes that will obviate the need
for professional intermediaries in divorce actions. M. WHEELER, supra note 16, at 117.
20. Ralph Nader and Mark Green have endorsed institutional changes that will
reduce reliance on lawyers for routine legal services such as title searches, simple wills,
and uncontested divorces. Ralph Nader Reports, LADIES HOME J., Aug. 1975, at 36; Green,
The High Cost of Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 8, 62. Similar
sentiments have been expressed in academic circles. See Cahn & Cahn, Power to the
People or the Profession?: The Public Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1005, 1019 (1970); see also Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Pro-
fession: The Right of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 595, 641-56, 662-68 (1973).
21. See note 25 infra and cases cited in Appendix I, all of which were actions against
lay divorce entrepreneurs.
22. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Wash. Post, June 26,
1976, at A4, col. I (civil antitrust suit filed by Justice Department on June 25, 1976
alleging that ABA restrictions on advertising unlawfully restrained price competition
among lawyers). Noteworthy as well is the ABA's decision in March 1975 to cease its ban
on certain types of prepaid legal service plans (after being besieged by such groups as
The Public Citizen and the National Consumer Center for Legal Services), Green, supra
note 20, at 62; and its decision in February 1976 to permit certain forms of advertising
(including fee information), N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1976, at 13, col. 1.
Further indices of the growing politicization of the issue of legal fees include inquiries
by the Senate Judiciary Committee, The Organized Bar: Self-Serving or Serving the
Public?: Hearings Before the Subcomnz. on Representation of Citizen Interest of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), and the Nader counter-
convention, held during the ABA's 97th annual convocation, which sought to dramatize
the point that the Canons of Ethics operate like a "Canons of Profit" to protect lawyers
at the expense of the public. Green, supra note 20, at 57.
23. See Appendix 1.
24. For service and cost comparisons, see Appendix 1.
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clerical assistance in preparing these forms have also been made avail-
able by lay divorce businesses and feminist organizations. The result,
in many jurisdictions, has been an appreciable and unprecedented
surge of pro se divorce activity.
2-
Lay divorce entrepreneurialism and its challenge to the lawyer
monopoly quickly attracted the attention of the organized bar.20 As
divorce kits and supplemental services proliferated, they were met
with a series of bar-initiated lawsuits seeking injunctions against what
was asserted to be "the unauthorized practice of law. ' 27 The desired
relief was generally forthcoming, and issued without exception if the
challenged laymen were personally assisting individual divorce plain-
tiffs. 28
These holdings are consistent with prevailing judicial definitions
of unauthorized practice of law. Although successful unauthorized
practice prosecutions before the Depression were directed almost ex-
25. In New York, former barber and furniture salesman James A. Winder opened
four "Divorce Yourself" offices in 1972 which generated over 1,000 completed actions in
a matter of months. Burke, New York "Divorce Yourself" Enjoined, 37 UNAUTH. PRAC.
NEws 22, 22 (1973). A recent unpublished survey of San Mateo County (California) files
revealed that 20% of the couples seeking divorces proceeded pro se. Friedman & Percival,
Who Sues for Divorce? Front Fault Through Fiction to Freedom, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 81
& n.33 (1976). In an interview with the authors, a member of the California Divorce
League (a consortium of lay divorce assistance businesses) indicated his understanding
that at least 21 lay assistance offices were open throughout the state. Telephone Interview
with Joseph M. Orr (Sept. 24, 1976) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal). Another
spokesman for the League, Mitch Buszek, maintains that 30% of California dissolution
actions arc now filed pro se. Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 1976, at 1, col. 1, and 5, col. 2. A lay
divorce office in Oregon handled approximately 600 clients per year before being sub-
jected to judicial restrictions. See note 233 infra. Sources describing other kits and services
are collected in Appendix 1.
26. Lawyers have a significant financial stake in the pro se divorce controversy. During
the 12-month period between July 1975 and June 1976, there were 1,072,000 divorces in
the United States. National Center for Health Statistics, HEW, Monthly Vital Statistics
Report 1 (Aug. 27, 1976). In California, where the pro se divorce volume has been highest
(see note 25 supra), the author of one divorce kit has estimated that those of his readers
who conducted their own actions would otherwise have paid some $50 million in legal
fees. Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
27. See cases cited in Appendix 1.
28.. See id. An Oregon Court of Appeals holding is typical:
[AiII personal contact between defendants and their customers in the nature of con-
sultation, explanation, recommendation, or advice or other assistance in selecting
particular forms, in filling out any part of the forms, or suggesting or advising how
the forms should be used in solving the particular customer's marital problems does
constitute the practice of law and must be and is strictly enjoined.
Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913, 919 (Or. App. 1975).
Despite one successful California prosecution in 1973, State Bar v. Corey, No. 157163
(Cal. Super. Ct., Oct. 11, 1973), reprinted in 38 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEWS 44 (1974), lay divorce
firms offering personalized form preparation assistance continue to operate on a large
scale in the state. See note 25 supra. These concerns have had to contend with a
vigorously enforced ban on divorce advertising, upheld as constitutional in Howard v.
Superior Court, 52 Cal. App. 3d 722, 125 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1975).
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clusively against impersonators of attorneys,29 the scope of the doctrine
has since expanded to proscribe the drafting of documents and the
giving of advice related to legal rights.3° Although most lay divorce
aids address themselves solely to the preparation of the standardized
forms necessary for initiating and concluding a divorce action,31 the
legal labels and formal functions of these documents render such
activities readily classifiable as unauthorized practice. Other laymen
29. For a review of the statutes and case law of this period, see F. HicKs & E. KATZ,
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW (1934). One exception to the general policy of imposing
sanctions only against those who fraudulently styled themselves "attorneys" or undertook
to represent others in court is People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919) (hold-
ing, oer vigorous dissent, that nonlawyer who prepared legal papers as business had
%iolated statute prohibiting unauthorized practice of law).
During the Depression, the organized bar mounted a campaign to widen the scope of
unauthorized practice. See note 41 infra. The campaign was a response to increasing
encroachment by banks, accountants, insurance companies, and real estate brokers upon
many aspects of lawyer activity. Although these organizations and individuals made no
serious attempt to supplant the attorney's exclusive right to represent litigants in court,
they did aid clients in Understanding and conforming with the intricate prescriptions of
tax laws, commercial law, and government regulations. For an account of lay incursions
circa 1930, and the resulting impact on attorney income, see Hicks & Katz, The Practice
of Law by Laymen and Lay -Igencies, 41 YALE L.J. 69, 70, 71 n.9 (1931).
30. For purposes of defining unauthorized practice, courts have typically enumerated
activities common in a lawyer's office practice. E.g., West Virginia State Bar v. Earley,
14- WV. Va. 504, 520, 109 S.E.2d 420, 431 (1959) ("legal advice and instructions to clients to
inform them of their rights and obligations; preparation for clients of documents re-
quiring knowledge of legal principles which is not possessed by an ordinary layman; and
appearance for clients before public tribunals"). For recent efforts at enumeration, see
State ex sel. Norvell v. Credit Bureau, 85 N.M. 521, 526, 514 P.2d 40, 45 (1973); and
Hecomovich v. Nielsen, 10 Wash. App. 563, 571, 518 P.2d 1081, 1087, review denied, 83
Wash. 2d 1012 (1974).
On occasion, the prohibited activities are limited to those deemed "complex." For a
review of the judicial dispute over whether complexity matters in fixing the bounds of
unauthorized practice, see J. FiscuER & D. L.%CHMAN, UNAUTiIORIzED PR' crICE HANDBOOK
114-48 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
31. Nearly all the published kits reviewed by the Project authors advise customers to
consult attorneys and lay specialists for information concerning ancillary legal matters
such as taxes and complex property dispositions. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA DIVORCE COUNCIL,
MANUAL FOR DIVoRCE introduction (1973); DIVORCE REFORM, INC., Do YOUR OWN DIVORCE
IN MAINE 21-23 (undated); C. SHERMAN, HOW TO Do YOUR OwN DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA
9 (1972); D. VILLIAMS & P. BLACK, THE S27 DIVORCE 2 (1972) (Colorado); WoMErN's LEGAL
CENTER OF SAN FR-NCIsco, GETTING OUT: A COLLECTIVE EXPERIENCE IN SELF-HELP DIVORCE
7 (1974). But see C. ALLEN, How TO Gur A NEW YORK DIVORCE FOR UNDER $100, at 24 (1973)
("Repeat: Exhaust every source of help you can before involving divorce lawyers.")
Personalized lay advice apparently has been marketed on a substantial scale only in
California, New York, and Oregon. The founder of the California Divorce League, a
consortium of California lay services, informed the Project authors that divorces in-
volving disputes were "beyond the scope of our services" and that plaintiffs with property
complications were referred to attorneys. Telephone Interview with Ruth Ordesch (Dec.
18, 1975) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal). Similar representations were also made
by another spokesman for the California Divorce League in a recent newspaper interview.
Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 1976, at 1, col. 1. Courts enjoining the personalized services of New
York and Oregon lay advisors did not suggest that the interdicted activities transcended
form preparation inl uncontested cases. See State v. Winder, 42 App. Div. 2d 1039, 348
N.Y.S.2d 270 (;973); Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913 (Or. App. 1975).
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involved in activities related to the practice of law have sometimes
been granted exemptions by courts unwilling to interfere with services
that are incidental to an established business (e.g., deed preparation
by real estate brokers and tax advice by accountants).32 But since lay
divorce enterprises do not give legal advice in conjunction with other
commercial services, the "incidental services" defense is unavailable
to them.
33
When divorce advice is published rather than delivered in person,
however, some courts have exempted it from unauthorized practice
liability.3 4 Oregon 35 and New York30 decisions drawing this distinction
relied upon the rationale developed in New York County Lawyers'
Association v. Dacey.3 7 In Dacey, the New York Court of Appeals
32. In the main, these exceptions have been the product of bar association suits
challenging advice or document preparation activities that constituted part of a well-
established occupational practice. Although such activities are unambiguously legal in
character, longstanding public reliance makes a prohibition difficult to justify on policy
grounds. Sometimes courts have escaped the dilemma by deciding to balance costs and
benefits accruing to the public from the performance of the challenged "incidental" act,
Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 647, 290 N.W. 795, 797 (1940) (conveyancing by
realtors), or by taking the custom of the community into account when fixing the bounds
of the practice of law, Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 186, 52 N.E.2d 27, 34
(1943) (lay preparation of income tax returns). Cases accepting the incidental character
of legal activities as an invitation to apply less stringent unauthorized practice standards
are collected in HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 136-38, and discussed in Note, Lay Divorce
Firms and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 423, 428-29 (1973). Cf.
Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 45, 247 S.W.2d 855, 862 (1952) (maintaining that "the guiding
principle" in unauthorized practice determinations is "whether under the circumstances
the preparation of the [legal] papers . . . is the business being carried on or whether this
really is ancillary to and an essential part of another business").
Many courts, however, have refused to grant special treatment to incidental services.
See, e.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 93, 366 P.2d 1, 12-13
(1961), supplemented on rehearing en banc, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962); Chicago
Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 34 Il1. 2d 116, 122, 214 N.E.2d 771, 774 (1966);
Hecomovich v. Nielson, 10 Wash. App. 563, 571-72, 518 P.2d 1081, 1087, review denied,
83 Wash. 2d 1012 (1974). These cases essentially adopt the rationale of the first Informative
Opinion issued by the ABA's Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, which
maintained that any provision of legal instruments or legal advice by laymen is un-
authorized practice, regardless of the circumstances. ABA Co'.1M. ON THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRAcTIcE OF LAW, INFORMATIVE OPINIONS 1 (1960).
33. See Note, supra note 32, at 433 (concluding that incidental services exception
"clearly does not apply to divorce firms"); Cf. Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 479-80,
48 N.W.2d 788, 796 (1951) ("[I]f the furnishing of the legal service is the primary
business of the actor such activity is the practice of law, even though such service is of
an elementary nature."); see also Note, Unauthorized Practice of Law and the Sale of
Divorce Kits, 38 ALB. L. REV. 332, 340-41 (1974).
34. See Appendix 1. Regarding the application of unauthorized practice doctrine to
legal publications generally, see Feigenbaum, Legal Advice Publications, 76 DIcK. L. REv.
419, 423-35 (1972); and Ells, Unauthorized Practice of Law by Way of Publications Giving
Legal Advice, 25 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEWS 295 (1959).
35. Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913 (Or. App. 1975).
36. State v. Winder, 42 App. Div. 2d 1039, 348 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1973).
37. 21 N.Y.2d 694, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422, rev'g 28 App. Div. 2d 161, 283
N.Y.S.2d 984 (1967). The New York Court of Appeals adopted in full the dissenting
opinion filed below by Judge Stevens of the appellate division, 28 App. Div. 2d at 171,
283 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
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sustained the publication of a do-it-yourself estate planning kit. The
Dacey court excluded publications from the ambit of unauthorized
practice on the ground that "the essential of legal practice" was "the
representation and the advising of a particular person in a particular
situation." 38 But this analysis has been rejected in two Florida Supreme
Court decisions enjoining pro se kits and services. 39 These latter
opinions emphasized the legal character of the form preparation advice
offered by divorce kits.
40
The policy considerations underlying judicial hostility to lay divorce
services are somewhat unclear. Although tiie organized bar has always
contended that its unauthorized practice campaign4' is not a "trade
union movement" but a service "in the public interest," 42 none of its
38. 28 App. Div. 2d 161, 174, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, 998, dissenting opinion adopted, 21
N.Y.2d 694, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1967). This analysis was drawn from an
earlier Connecticut decision involving the same defendant, which enjoined the provision
of personalized estate planning advice by nonlawyers. Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 154
Conn. 129, 222 A.2d 339 (1967), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 683 (1967). The New York and
Connecticut Dacey holdings are discussed in Feigenbaum, supra note 34, at 419-22, 427-
29; and Note, Unauthorized Practice of Law and the Sale of Divorce Kits, 38 ALB. L. REV.
332, 333-35 (1974).
39. Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1974); Florida Bar v. American Legal
& Business Forms, 274 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1973). Cf. Palmer v. Unauthorized Practice Comm.,
438 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (sale of printed will forms enjoined as unauthorized
practice).
40. Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 1974), held that the kits con-
tained "direct legal instructions and advice" and "assume[d] an in lieu role in place
and instead of an attorney at law." See Florida Bar v. American Legal & Business Forms,
274 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1973).
41. The chief proponent of an expansive construction of the unauthorized practice
doctrine has been the organized bar. The ABA Committee on the Unauthorized Practice
of Law was established in 1930 to marshal the energies of the profession in a campaign
against competing lay services. ABA CoMMt. ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW,
INFORMATIVE OPINIONS 1 (1960). The Committee is still active. It brings no suits itself but
is involved in public relations and publishes a periodical, Unauthorized Practice News,
which contains form pleadings for use in litigation conducted by state and local un-
authorized practice committees. Forty-nine state bar associations currently have active
Unauthorized Practice of Law Committees. Public Information-State Unauthorized Prac-
tice of Law Committees-1973.74, 38 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEws 88-125 (1974). These state
organizations both initiate litigation and investigate complaints made by local bar as-
sociations. The Florida committee reported five pending unauthorized practice cases, six
concluded cases, and 190 completed investigations in the July-December 1974 interval
alone. Florida Bar Reports a Very Busy Six Months of Activity on Unauthorized Practice
of Law Matters, 39 UNAUTH. PRAc. NEws 152 (1975). These and similar efforts are in
accord with the ABA directive that a "Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the Un-
authorized Practice of Law." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 3 (1975).
This Canon is an expanded version of a 1937 amendment to the Canons of Ethics. ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 47.
42. Remarks of Hon. Orison S. Marden, past president of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, reprinted in ABA NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW 14 (1962) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CONFERENCE]. Frederick Buesser,
Jr., chairman of the ABA's Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, was quoted
in a September 1976 interview as conceding that the bar's enforcement activities "do
give the appearance that we are attempting to preserve our monopoly for our own
economic purpose"; lie maintained, however, that such efforts were undertaken to
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suits against divorce concerns has developed a record of more than
minimal mishaps attributable to lay assistance. 43 And none of the
judicial opinions in those cases challenged the accuracy of the pub-
lished or verbal instructions at issue.44 Indeed, one court explicitly
held that even a perfect record of consumer satisfaction would be
"irrelevant." 45 Decisions have turned not on the quality of pro se kits
or services, but on whether proffered advice is found to fall within the
province of legal practice. 40 Such a narrowly focused inquiry ignores
achieve "what is the best thing for the public." Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 1976, at 1, col. I,
and 5, col. 2. See West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 527, 109 S.E.2d
420, 435 (1959); Buesser, The "Kit" Age and Unauthorized Practice (Divorce, Will, and
Corporation Kits), 39 UNATI1. PR.c. NEws 12, 12 (1974). The ABA's Code of Professional
Responsibility provides further evidence that the bar perceives itself as vindicating the
public interest. For example, Ethical Consideration 3-1 states, in pertinent part:
Because of the fiduciary and personal character of the lawyer-client relationship and
the inherently complex natire of our legal system, the public can better be assured
of the requisite responsibility and competence if the practice of law is confined to
those who are subject to the requirements and regulations imposed upon members
of the legal profession.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL Rs'ONSIBILITY EC 3-1 (1975). See id. EC 3-2 to 3-5.
There are, however, occasional concessions that the self-interest of the legal profession
is a salient consideration in its vigilant pursuit of unauthorized practitioners: "[I]t must
be remembered that there would not long be a highly trained legal profession to serve
the public if the lawyers are going to have to compete with everyone who has a type-
writer and a set of forms." NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra, at 27 (Warren Resh, editor of
Unauthorized Practice News). See Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 478-79, 48 N.W.2d
788, 795 (1951).
43. Efforts by state bar investigators in New York and Oregon to unearth complaints
from the literally thousands of pro se divorce plaintiffs assisted by kit sellers bore
virtually no fruit. See Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913, 918 (Or. App. 1975);
Burke, New York "Divorce Yourself" Enjoined, 37 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEws 22, 27-28 (1973).
Cf. Resh, More on Do-It-Yourself Divorce Kits and Services, 37 UNATH. PRAc. NEWS 59,
69 (1973) (prior to filing of Oregon bar association suit, state Consumer Protection
Division conducted preliminary investigation of kit purveyors and "found no suggestion"
of illegality).
44. See, e.g., Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913, 917 (Or. App. 1975) (if used
properly, information and forms are effective). None of the decisions cited in Appendix
I mention any inadequacies in lay form preparation advice.
45. State Bar v. Corey, No. 157163 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Bernadino County, Oct. 11,
1973), reported in California Restrains "No-Fault Divorce Consultation Service," 38
UNAUTI. PRAC. NEWs 44, 48 (1974).
46. Unauthorized practice opinions in contexts other than lay divorce services have
long disregarded the absence of injury to customers. The following language is typical:
"We shall not dwell on the adequacy of the advice given .... The decision must rest on
the nature of the services rendered and on whether they were inherently legal . . .
services." Application of New York County Lawyers Ass'n (In re Bercu), 273 App. Div.
524, 531, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209, 215 (1948); accord, Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver
Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 410, 312 P.2d 998, 1004-06 (1957); Grievance Comm. v. Dacey,
154 Conn. 129, 149-50, 222 A.2d 339, 350 (1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 683 (1967).
Blanket condemnations of lay practitioners are almost neier supported with specific
examples of injury to the public. See, e.g., F. HIcKs & E. KATZ, supra note 29, at 4;
NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 42, at 119; Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 477-78,
48 N.W.2d 788, 794 (1951); Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors,
41 Wash. 2d 697, 699, 251 P.2d 619, 621 (1952). Two prominent scholars assert that in
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the more fundamental issue of whether proscribing lay assistance
serves any public interest.
There are two possible policy justifications for invoking unauthor-
ized practice doctrine to prevent laymen from offering advice to pro
se divorce plaintiffs. Both rest on empirical assumptions. First, it can
be argued that, despite the advent of no-fault reforms, marital dissolu-
tion remains an adjudicatory process. As such, it demands a lawyer's
special expertise in guiding litigants through the conventions of an
adversarial system. However compelling this argument may be with
respect to contested divorces, it is of questionable merit when spouses
are in agreement on the terms of their decree. Indeed, the conventions
of contested litigation seem themselves anomalous where petitioner
and respondent seek identical relief.47 For parties not in dispute,
divorce pleadings and court hearings function not as opportunities to
advance opposing interests, but simply as formal requirements to be
satisfied in order to secure entry of a dissolution decree. Therefore,
the initial argument for discouraging lay assistance in such cases must
be based on the presumed intricacy of these procedures. Courts and
commentators have asserted that the procedural complexities which
inhere in divorce actions cannot be addressed by laymen without
generating administrative burdens for courts and injuries to parties. 4s
The Project explores the empirical premises that underlie this proposi-
tion.
Second, it is often maintained that lawyers play an essential advisory
role throughout the dissolution process which transcends their court-
related function. Whether contested or not, divorces may involve
significant ancillary issues. Opponents of pro se divorce argue that
guidance concerning parental and property matters demands legal
training. 49 While the importance of the rights affected by divorce is
universally acknowledged, the contribution made by lawyers to their
disposition is again an empirical proposition which this Project ad-
fact the public has typically benefited from access to lay legal services. Q. JOHNSTONE &
D. HOPsON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WVORK: AN ANALYSIS OF TIlE PROFESSION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND ENGLAND 194 (1967).
•17. These conventions are defensible only insofar as they further cognizable state
concerns, such as those articulated by the Family Law Section of the ABA in its Proposed
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: to "promote the amicable settlement of disputes"
between divorcing parties, and to "mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their
children caused by the legal dissolution of marriage." Proposed Act, supra note 13, at
136. Whether adversarial procedures advance these interests by forcing parties to secure
useful attorney assistance is an empirical question largely unexplored to date: it con-
stitutes a central inquiry of this Project.
48. See p. 123 infra.
49. See pp. 129-30 infra.
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dresses. The fundamental question is whether requiring all dissolution
plaintiffs to pay for an attorney's expertise and fiduciary responsibili-
ties5° secures sufficient benefits to outweigh the potential advantages
of widespread public access to inexpensive pro se divorce assistance.
II. The Anatomy of a Monopoly: The Empirical Project
A. Methodology
The Project authors designed an empirical study to test the policy
assumptions underlying recent applications of unauthorized practice
doctrine to pro se divorce kits and services. The goals of the inquiry
were:
a) to examine the lawyer's form preparation, legal advice, and
other functions in uncontested 1 no-fault divorce proceedings,
and to assess whether these functions justify the perpetuation
of a professional monopoly; and
b) to investigate the characteristics and experiences of a group of
divorce kit purchasers.
To evaluate lawyer contributions in uncontested divorce actions,
the authors drew upon three sources of data: a random sample of
dissolution files for cases heard in the New Haven and Bridgeport
50. The fiduciary consideration has played a major role in unauthorized practice cases
distinguishing between published and personalized legal advice. See New York County
Lawyer's Ass'n v. Dacey, 28 App. Div. 2d 161, 174, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, 998, rev'd, 21 N.Y.2d
694, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1967) (published legal advice held not to constitute
practice of law because it did not actuate "that relation of confidence and trust so
necessary to the status of attorney and client"). The Dacey holding was followed in sub-
sequent New York and Oregon decisions permitting the publication of divorce kits. See
p. 112 supra. The pleadings in a recent bar association suit emphasized the importance
of the fiduciary lawyer-client relationship to divorce plaintiffs. See Colorado Bar As-
sociation Starts Suit Against Lay Divorce Specialists, 39 UNAUrI. PR\c. NEws 87, 91
(1975). See generally ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsInILITY EC 3-3, 3-4 (1975).
The necessity of imposing a fiduciary relation in the context of divorce form processing
is questioned at p. 140 infra. The importance of fiduciary safeguards for parties
desiring advice about financial and parental matters is not discussed in the Project, since
no attempt has been made by any lay divorce agency to render such assistance. But it
should be noted that many individuals who are now consulted frequently on these
questions-such as social workers, accountants, and real estate agents-are not bound by
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
51. The term "uncontested" is used throughout the Project in its legal sense: at the
time the actions studied were claimed for a hearing, no responsive pleadings had been
filed by the defendant or his attorney, and the defendant offered no objections at tie
hearing to the settlement presented for judicial ratification. It cannot, of course, be
inferred from the absence of legal contest that no disputes existed during the pendency
of the proceeding. See pp. 142-45 infra.
Unauthorized Practice and Pro Se Divorce
(Connecticut) Superior Courts, 5 2 questionnaires mailed to lawyers who
represented the plaintiffs in the sampled cases, and interviews with
almost a third of these plaintiffs.
The Project's sample of uncontested divorces contained 331 court
files53-about 25% of the uncontested cases handled by private at-
torneys in New Haven and Bridgeport between April 1 and Septem-
ber 30, 1975.54 These cases will hereinafter be referred to as "lawyer-
initiated" divorces. Forty-six dissolutions conducted by legal aid at-
torneys were also surveyed,55 and will receive separate consideration
where appropriate. 5 Information available from the court files in-
cluded duration of marriage, number of minor children, content of
awards requested and granted, and provisions of separation agTee-
52. All the divorces surveyed for the Project were recorded in Connecticut, which
provides two no-fault grounds for marital dissolution: that "[tihe marriage has broken
down irretrievably" and that "the parties have lived apart for . . . eighteen months . . .
by reason of incompatibility." Nine fault grounds are still available. CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46-32 (1975).
In '974, 49% of the divorces recorded in Connecticut occurred in the two counties
served by the New Haven and Bridgeport courts. STATE OF CONNEcIicUT, 127TH REGISTRA-
TION REPORT 191 (1974). The New Haven sample was generated by randomly extracting
199 file numbers from the uncontested divorce calendars for the interval of April 1, 1975
through September 30, 1975. In Bridgeport, where court calendars are not saved for
recordkeeping purposes, a search was conducted of randomly selected groups of file
numbers which ultimately produced 200 divorces heard during the surveyed period. The
equal size of the initial Bridgeport and New Haven file samples reflects the fact that
the two counties have been generating virtually identical dissolution caseloads in recent
years. Id.; STATE OF CONNECTICUT, 125TH REcISTRATON REPORT 191 (1972).
53. An initial sample of 399 files (see note 52 supra) was reduced to 331 by removing
files for divorces handled by legal aid attorneys and by eliminating from consideration
files for contested divorces. There remained 160 New Haven and 171 Bridgeport files,
representing dissolutions which were both uncontested and conducted by private attorneys.
The initial New Haven sample of 199 divorces contained 38 legal aid cases, while the
200 Bridgeport files produced only eight. The low Bridgeport total is largely attributable
to staffing difficulties which plagued the local legal aid office throughout the months
selected for study. Telephone Interview with David Snyder, Fairfield County Legal
Services attorney (Feb. 2, 1976) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal). The contested
divorces, on the other hand, were concentrated in the Bridgeport sample, because it had
been compiled without the aid of uncontested court calendars. See note 52 supra. Al-
though data was gathered only on those actions in which decree forms were labeled
"uncontested," 21 of the 200 Bridgeport files nevertheless contained answers and cross-
complaints which were not withdrawn until after the case was claimed for a hearing.
Such pleadings usually signal serious financial or custodial battles, making the proceed-
ings in which they appear inappropriate for an assessment of private lawyer performance
in uncontested divorces. In New Haven computerized court calendars which excluded all
such formally contested cases were available. Only one contested case appeared in the
sample, presumably reflecting a coding error by the clerk's office.
54. This figure is derived from a count of actions listed in the New Haven uncon-
tested calendars which were initiated by private attorneys and an extrapolation of the
comparable Bridgeport volume. The Bridgeport computation was made by determining
the relation between the total number of civil action files in the court archives and the
subset checked in the search for uncontested divorce actions. See note 52 supra.
55. See note 53 supra.
56. Data from the legal aid divorces are presented and discussed at pp. 158-60 infra.
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ments.5 7 In the course of transcribing this information, an occasional
datum was inadvertently omitted. Certain Project calculations, there-
fore, proceed from a base which excludes a few files. Wherever this
occurs, the number of excluded files (rarely more than one percent of
the sample) is specified.
To obtain a second source of data, 104 of the 331 plaintiffs in the
lawyer-initiated sample were contacted by phone. The remainder were
either not listed in the files of the telephone company, had unpub-
lished phone numbers, or were otherwise unavailable.5 8 Ninety-nine
of the individuals contacted consented to be interviewed. They are
hereinafter denominated "interviewed clients." The low refusal rate
(5%) militates against the possibility of self-selection, a major source of
bias in other empirical studies on divorce.5 9 Interviewed clients were
questioned concerning, inter alia, the amount of contact they had with
their attorneys, the extent to which their settlements were influenced
by such contact, and the size of the fee charged for attorney services. °
The sample of interviewed clients did not underrepresent plaintiffs
who experienced relatively complex divorces, i.e., those divorces in
which the scope for lawyer contributions would presumably be great-
est. In fact, comparisons with the total class of cases from which the
interviews were drawn indicate that the reverse was true.0 ' Interviewed
clients tended to be married longer, were more likely to own homes,
and had a representative allotment of minor children (present in about
57. Appendix 2 lists all categories of data recorded.
58. TABLE A
Plaintiffs in Lawyer-Initiated Divorces: Results of Search
Reached by Phone and Interviewed 99
Reached by Phone, Refused Interview 5
No Answer* 12
No Listing 150
Unpublished Phone Number 65
Total 331
* At least five efforts were made to reach every "no answer" plaintiff. The calls were
made at different times of day over a two-week period.
59. That a majority of lawyer-assisted plaintiffs were not interviewed by the authors
is attributable to the imperfections of the search technique, see note 58 supra, and not
to a dearth of cooperation. In contrast, Goode's study of divorced women in metropolitan
Detroit was hampered by a 19% refusal rate, W. GOODE, AFrER DIVORCE 352 (1956); and
the questionnaires mailed in a Wisconsin survey were returned by only 18.5% of ad-
dressees, N. KOHUT, DIVORCE FOR THE UNBROKEN MARRIAGE 18 (1973).
60. The form used in conducting these interviews is attached as Appendix 3.
61. Phone listings were most difficult to secure for those plaintiffs who shifted
residence shortly after the recording of their divorce decree. Factors tending to decrease
mobility (i.e., age, children, duration of marriage, and home ownership), would also
conduce to greater complications in divorce actions.
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50% of the cases).6 02 Finally, although incomplete demographic data in
the court files preclude comparative analysis, the interviewed plain-
tiffs reported enough short pre-filing separations (64% under six
months) and high joint incomes (38% over $15,000) to ensure sub-
stantial representation for these indicators of potential divorce com-
plexity.
3
62. The following table compares the entire sample of lawyer-initiated divorces with
the subset of files pertaining to divorces of interviewed clients.
TABLE B






I. Female Plaintiff 68.6% 71.7%
2. Marriage Duration over 10 Years 34.9% 40.0%
(n=324)' (n=95)b
3. Children Involved 48.7% 49.5%
(n=330)2
4. Home Ownership Noted in File 35.3% 54.5%
5. Defendant Represented by an Attorney 43.9% 50.0%
(n=330)a (n=98)
b
6. Divorce Not Claimed for a Hearing within 43.3% 40.6%
Five Months of Complaint (n=312)c (n=96)
b
7. Decree Contains Property Award 23.9% 36.4%
8. Decree Contains Child Support Award in 14.1% 17.5%
Excess of $50/wk (n=325)' (n=97)b
* The disparities in frequency of home ownership and property awards are statistically
significant at tile .001 and .02 levels respectively. The other contrasts displayed in Table
B are not significant at the .05 level.
o Base is less than 331 due to the exclusion of files for which data were inadvertently
omitted.
b Base is less than 99 due to the exclusion of files for which data were inadvertently
omitted.
Base is less than 331 because data on the dates divorces were claimed for a hearing
were not collected from the first 19 files surveyed.
63. Parties who have been separated for a substantial interval before filing for divorce
are more likely to have disposed of jointly owned property and to have reached an ac-
commodation concerning financial and parental matters. For parties in a relatively high
income bracket, there usually will be more tangibles to divide and a heightened prob-
ability of tax complications. See generally Basi & Weinstein, The Internal Revenue Code
and Its Impact on Divorce Settlements, 53 TAxrs 132 (1975); Meeker, Federal Income Tax
Implications of Divorce, 14 WVASHBURN L.J. 219 (1975).
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Questionnaires were sent to the 218 lawyers who represented the
331 plaintiffs in the randomly sampled cases. One hundred and twelve
(51%) of the attorneys responded, and 106 returned completed ques-
tionnaires.64 The 158 files handled by respondent lawyers were then
compared with the total pool of lawyer-initiated files; no major con-
trasts emerged.a
In Table C, the income distribution among interviewed client families is compared
with that among families nationwide in 1974.
TABLE C
Income Distributions for Interviewed Client Families and All United States Families
All Families* Interviewed Clients (n=97)a
$ 0- 5,000 13.0% 3.1%
$ 5,000 - 10,000 22.6% 24.7%
$10,000 - 15,000 24.3% 34.0%
$15,000 + 39.8% 38.1%
"Adapted from BuRFtu oF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsTRACT or THE UNITED STATES
390 (1975).
1 Base is less than 99 due to the exclusion of two interviews in which no response
was given.
The atypical (by national standards) wealth of Connecticut residents made it likely
that a substantial percentage of sampled divorces would involve the ancillary financial
issues which cause concern among critics of pro se dissolution. The state ranks third in
the United States in per capita income. BURE.U or THE CENSUS, STATIsTICAXL ABs-IrRAcT OF
THE UNITED STATES 388 (1975).
64. Four of the 218 questionnaires never reached the addressees. Of a total of 112
questionnaires returned, one was damaged in the mails, and five were not completed be-
cause, according to recipients, their divorce practices were too minimal to permit mean-
ingful generalization.
On the average, respondent lawyers respresented 17 divorce plaintiffs per year and
had 12 years of experience with divorces. They reported practices spread more or less
evenly across the three categories of single practitioner, one to three partners, and four
or more partners.
65. TABLE D





Characteristic Files (n=331) (n=158)
1. Female Plaintiff 68.6% 68.3%
2. Marriage Duration over 10 Years 34.9% 32.0%
(n-324)2 (n153)b
3. Children Involved 48.7% 51.6%
(n330)4 (n=157)b
4. Home Ownership Noted in File 35.3% 43.7%
5. Defendant Represented by an Attorney 43.9% 49.0%
(n=330)1 (n=157)b
6. Divorce not Claimed for a Hearing Within 43.3% 45.3%
Five Months of Complaint (n=312)c (n=150)b
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Ethical strictures precluded an attempt to obtain information from
attorneys regarding specific divorce cases.60 Rather, questionnaire
recipients were asked to characterize certain aspects of their divorce
practices. Estimates were requested regarding (1) the frequency of
interspousal disputes over custody, property, and support orders in
uncontested actions; and (2) the average amount of time spent per
uncontested divorce on various tasks, including conversations with the
client, preparation of forms, and negotiations with the defendant or
his attorney. The questionnaire concluded with an open-ended query
which invited the writer to identify "the lawyer's most important
functions in an uncontested divorce action."
6' 7
In pursuing the Project's second major line of inquiry, the pro se
divorce phenomenon, the authors sought assistance from the New
Haven Women's Center. The Center, which had compiled and mar-
keted the only do-it-yourself divorce kit available in Connecticut, 8
provided a list of 199 kit purchasers. Ninety-five were reached by
phone, and 93 (98%) cooperated with the interviewer.69 Twenty-three
7. Decree Contains Property Award 23.9% 24.7%
8. Decree Contains Child Support Award in 14.1% 14.7%
Excess of $50/wk (n=325)2 (n=156)b
* Of the eight comparisons displayed in Table B, none are statistically significant at
the .02 level. Only the home ownership differential is significant at the .05 level.
n Base is less than 331 due to the exclusion of files for which data were inadvertently
omitted.
b Base is less than 158 due to the exclusion of files for which data were inadvertently
omitted.
Base is less than 331 because data on the dates divorces were claimed for a hearing
were not collected from the first 19 files surveyed.
66. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1975). ("A Lawyer Should
Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client.")
67. The questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix 4.
68. PRO SE DISSOLUTION GROUP, PRO SE DISSOLUTION KIT (1975). The kit's contents are
detailed in note 224 infra. Sales to the general public began in March 1975, although a
few pro se plaintiffs obtained divorces as early as December 1974 with a preliminary
version of the kit. Included in the four-dollar packet are samples of the forms required
for a dissolution decree, coupled with instructions on completion and filing in court. The
kit also explains the mechanics of the court hearing which precedes issuance of a decree.
Women's Center personnel provide no clerical or form-completion assistance to purchasers.
69. TABLE E
Divorce Kit Purchasers: Results of Search
Reached by Phone and Interviewed 93
Reached by Phone, Refused Interview 2
No Answer* 3
No Listing 95
Unpublished Phone Number 6
Total 199
At least five efforts were made to reach every "no answer" kit purchaser. The calls
were made at different times of day over a two week period.
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of those interviewed had already obtained a dissolution decree with
the aid of the kit's instructions; 21 were in the process of doing so. The
remaining 49 had decided, for varying reasons, to postpone or reject
kit use. The Project's data summaries for the pro se sample do not
include the latter group, which will be treated separately.t0
Interviews with kit purchasers were structured to elicit motivations
for dispensing with lawyer assistance, to probe for possible complica-
tions arising out of the decision to proceed pro se, and to discover
whether the pro se plaintiffs differed from their lawyer-assisted coun-
terparts in terms of education, income, duration of marriage, or age.
71
To supplement the interviews, the authors examined the court files
for all pro se divorces recorded in the New Haven Superior Court
between December 1, 1974 and October 31, 1975.72 Of the 31 divorces
located, three had been accomplished without resort to the Women's
Center kit73 The individuals responsible were contacted by phone,
bringing the Project's pro se interview sample to 96.
B. Empirical Analysis
The use of unauthorized practice doctrine to prohibit lay divorce
kits and counseling rests on certain empirical assumptions concerning
the nature and extent of attorney participation in dissolution proceed-
Lgs. Those assumptions will form the organizing principles for this
section.
Since the form preparation aspect of the lawyer monopoly is the
only one to have been seriously challenged by laymen, it constitutes
the crux of the unauthorized practice controversy. The principal
arguments for proscribing lay assistance rest on assumptions concern-
ing the need for professional expertise in document selection and com-
pletion. Initial consideration is, therefore, given to the legal forms
necessary for a dissolution. The Project then assesses lawyer involve-
ment in the allocation of financial and parental rights which may be
involved in uncontested divorce proceedings. The importance of at-
torney attention to such ancillary matters is often invoked as a justifica-
tion for excluding lay advisors from all aspects of the dissolution
process.
70. See pp. 162-63 infra.
71. The forms used in conducting the interviews constitute Appendix 5.
72. No pro se divorces were heard in Bridgeport Superior Court during the period
investigated.
73. In interviews with the authors, these plaintiffs indicated that they had mastered
the necessary procedures by consulting the Connecticut Practice Book, a guide for
practitioners available at local law libraries.
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1. Form Preparation and Court Proceedings Prerequisite to
Dissolution
To secure an uncontested divorce decree in Connecticut, parties
must file several standardized documents which initiate the action,
claim it for a hearing in court, and record the terms of the dissolution.
Instructions to pro se plaintiffs concerning these forms constitute the
substance of the New Haven divorce kit. In other jurisdictions, pub-
lished and oral advice of a similar nature has been the focus of un-
authorized practice litigation.74 A representative judicial opinion con-
cerning lay divorce services concluded that "filling out any part of the
forms, or suggesting.., how the forms should be used . . .does con-
stitute the practice of law and must be ... strictly enjoined. ' 7 5
The rationale for prohibiting such document preparation advice is
that the complexity of form completion necessitates an attorney's as-
sistance. As the Supreme Court of Florida observed:
It is a fallacy to look upon these documents and court pleadings
as "mere forms", as if they were some kind of identification card.
A pleading, or adoption of a particular document to use,
however seemingly "simple", has often involved extensive research
and an evaluation of alternatives which were discarded as in-
advisable."
In a similar vein, the editor of the American Bar Association pub-
lication Unauthorized Practice News predicts that form processing
errors would be an "inevitable" consequence of lay-assisted pro se
divorce, resulting in a "terrific burden .. .on the courts and court
personnel."
77
An examination of the documents underpinning a Connecticut
divorce,78 however, raises serious questions about the necessity of
reserving form completion exclusively to lawyers. The analysis begins
with a discussion of the complaint, claim for trial, and decree forms,
74. See pp. 110-15 supra.
75. Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913, 919 (Or. App. 1975).
76. Florida Bar Ass'n v. American Legal & Business Forms, 274 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla.
1973).
77. Resh, D'o-It-Yourself Divorce Kits and Services, 47 Wis. B. BULL. 23, 23-24 (1974).
78. A survey of divorce kits from other jurisdictions suggest that Connecticut pro-
cedures are not atypical, although there are some variations in the labeling of forms and
the manner in which they must be filed. Compare the descriptions in CALIFORNIA DIVORCE
COUNCIL, supra note 31; DIVORCE REFORM, INC., supra note 31; and D. WILLIAMS & P.
BLACK, supra note 31. See FLORIDA RULES OF COURT, Forms 1.943, 1.975, 1.995 (1975). See
also Pagel, A Proposal for Reducing the Cost of Legal Representation in Divorce Pro-
ceedings, 11 WILLAMETrE L.J. 344, 346 (1975).
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which are requisites in all actions and were the only instruments in-
volved in 30% of the sampled divorces. 79
The divorce commences with a complaint. The complaint issues on
a sheet of ruled legal-sized paper containing two punched holes of
meticulously specified diameter and locale,80 and must be "substan-
tially in accord" with Form 396 of the Connecticut Practice Book.81
An attorney or pro se plaintiff's responsibilities concerning Form 396
are complete when he has filled in the addresses of the parties, the.
maiden name of the wife, the date and place of the marriage, the
grounds for the divorce, the names of any minor children, and the
claims for relief.8 2 There are 11 grounds for divorce in Connecticut,
but "irretrievable breakdown" of the marriage was offered as the sole
basis for dissolution in 81% of the lawyer-initiated cases and in all of
the pro se complaints examined by the authors.8 3
The only aspect of the complaint which might prove at all problem-
atic to laymen is the section requiring the petitioner to list the "re-
liefs" desired. A pro se plaintiff conceivably could fail to make an
appropriate request for child support, alimony, or a division of prop-
erty. But such omissions occurred frequently in the lawyer-initiated
divorces, with no apparent ill effects. In 29% of the 131 lawyer-
initiated cases in which no property or support adjustment was claimed
by either party at any time before the hearing, such provisions were
nonetheless incorporated in the decree of divorce.
The pro se plaintiffs who received divorces in the surveyed period
negotiated Form 396 without difficulty.8 4 The greatest impediment
proved to be the recently enacted statutory requirement that a dissolu-
tion complaint be signed by "a commissioner of the superior court or
79. These three forms need not be supplemented unless the action involves children,
financial orders, or a spouse absent from the jurisdiction. Procedures governing these
more complex cases are outlined at pp. 127-28 infra.
80. CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 79 (1975).
81. Id. § 374.
82. A copy of Form 896 is attached in Appendix 6.
83. Connecticut statutory provisions make the choice of grounds potentially relevant
in actions featuring battles over finances and custody, since the judge is granted discre-
tion to take the cause for dissolution into account when assigning custody or distributing
property, CONN. GEN. Stat. §§ 46-42, -51 (1975). Fault is omitted as a consideration with
regard to child support awards. Id. § 46-57. Two complaints in the sampled lawyer-
initiated cases attempted to imbue the "irretrievable breakdown" ground with fault
connotations by ascribing the breakdown to the defendant's unspecified "misconduct."
For a critique of fault vestiges in nominally no-fault systems, see R. LEVY, supra note 5,
at 52.
84. The only pervasive problem appeared to be the spelling of "irretrievable break-
down." One pro se plaintiff was admonished for using the wrong size of paper, and
another omitted a mandatory datum and was told by the clerk to retype his complaint.
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a judge or clerk of the court to which it is returnable."'s Commis-
sioners of the superior court are lawyers licensed to practice in Con-
necticut. A review of the court files indicated that New Haven pro se
plaintiffs had solved this problem by obtaining the signature of a
superior court clerk. But one out of the total of 47 interviewed pro se
plaintiffs, 13-all of whom resided in counties outside New Haven-
reported significant difficulties in obtaining the necessary signature.8 6
Upon completion, the complaint must be served on the defendant.87
Pro se and lawyer-assisted plaintiffs alike typically obtained service of
process by paying a sheriff between $10 and $50 to place the complaint
in the hands of the defendant spouse. Occasionally, service was made
by registered mail or publication. 8
After 90 days, cases may be claimed for a hearing by filing Form
JD(COLP)-6002 with the clerk of the superior court to which the
complaint was returned. 9 Form JD(COLP)-6002 requires an attesta-
tion that: (a) the case is uncontested; (b) all residence requirements
have been met;90 and (c) 90 days have passed since the return date on
the complaint. These attestations are made by placing an "x" in the
85. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-89 (1975). This requirement encompasses all "[m]esne
process in civil actions." Id. Divorce complaints were expressly brought within the
purview of § 52-89 by a 1974 amendment to the Dissolution of Marriage Act. Id. § 46-36
(requiring that dissolutions be commenced with "the service and filing of a complaint
as in all other civil actions").
The chairman and vice-chairman of the Connecticut Bar Association's Family Law
Section maintain that the amendment "is designed to reduce potential difficulties and
dangers to the courts and the public in so-called 'do-it-yourself divorce.'" Schoonmaker
& Balbirer, Survey of 1974 Developments in Connecticut Family Law, 49 CONN. B.J. 1, 4
(1975). If so, the "protective" measure is singularly arbitrary and meaningless; no
Connecticut statutory or judicial provision ascribes any probative implications to the
signature. Requiring its presence unnecessarily burdens self-representation, which is ex-
pressly excluded from the unauthorized practice prohibition set forth in CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 51-88 (1975).
This impediment to pro se divorce actions has recently been vitiated by the state
judiciary's modification of its procedural rules. Effective October 1, 1976, an amendment
to the Connecticut Practice Book directs superior court clerks to sign pro se complaints
"unless [they are] defective as to form." CONNECTICUT PRAcicE BOOK § 28 (1976).
86. Six of these plaintiffs were able to cajole initially recalcitrant superior court
clerks into signing. The other seven met with obdurate denials. Five ultimately secured
the signature of a sympathetic lawyer, and two signed their own writs. Future pro se
plaintiffs should be spared such difficulties, given a recent amendment to the rules of
practice which requires clerks to sign nondefective pro se complaints. See note 85 supra.
87. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-36 (1975).
88. See p. 108 infra. Eleven percent of the lawyer-initiated files revealed use of such
alternative service.
89. See CONNECTiCUT PPncrIcE BOOK § 394 (1975). A copy of Form JD(COLP)-6002 is
included in Appendix 6.
90. The Connecticut Dissolution of Marriage Act requires that one party to the
divorce be "a resident of this state for at least the twelve months . . . next preceding the
date of the decree," unless "one of the parties was domiciled in this state at the time of
the marriage" and has returned "with the intention of permanently remaining." CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46-35 (1975).
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box opposite each assertion. Provided that no cross-complaint has been
filed and the defendant has waived 10-days notice of the filing of
Form JD(COLP)-6002, the case proceeds to trial. Pro se plaintiffs were
significantly more prompt in filing claims for a hearing than even
those lawyers representing parties seeking relatively simple dissolu-
tions.91
If no counsel has appeared for him, the defendant can ease the
judge's burden at the final hearing by entering a pro se appearance. A
pro se appearance is effected by signing an Appearance Form (D
(COLP)-6000). Otherwise the judge, in conformity with the terms of
the federal Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act,92 must make a finding that
the defendant is not in the military services of the United States. The
plaintiff makes this possible by signing an affidavit similar or identical
to Form 396.25 of the Connecticut Practice Book Annotated, which
attests the plaintiff's belief that the defendant is a civilian.
The judge's discretion relative to the granting of the "dissolution"
is limited, since a decree must enter on either party's uncorroborated
testimony that the marriage has broken down irretrievably, provided
that the husband and wife have signed a stipulation to that effect. 3
In contrast to the pro se files, 86% of which included such affidavits,
only one-third94 of the lawyer-initiated files in the sample contained
a stipulation of breakdown.9 5 Its absence leaves the judge the option
either to deny the dissolution or to demand corroboration by witnesses
who are not parties. But the former is almost unheard of in uncon-
tested cases,9" and the infrequent reliance upon testimony of non-
91. Since 30 of the 31 pro se divorces involved no support or property awards, see
note 232 infra, only the 124 lawyer-initiated files with comparably limited decrees were
used for time comparisons. Nonetheless, 61.3% of the pro se plaintiffs filed their claim for
hearing within 120 days of the complaint, compared to 27.4% of the lawyers representing
similarly situated plaintiffs.
Three pro se claims (9.7%) and 48 lawyer-initiated claims (38.7%) followed the filing
of the complaint by more than 150 days. Seventeen lawyer-initiated cases (13.7%) were
not claimed until over 300 days had elapsed; no pro se file indicated a like delay. The
contrast in promptness of filing between lawyers and pro se plaintiffs is statistically
significant at the .001 level.
92. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520 (1970).
93. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-48(a) (1975). A similar standard is set forth in § 305 of the
revised Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. See note 13 supra. Even for states without
such provisions in their no-fault divorce statutes, decrees are almost never denied. A
1973 study of 20 no-fault divorce jurisdictions concluded that the no-fault system had
the effect of making divorce "available upon unilateral demand." Foster & Freed, Divorce
Reform: Brakes on Breakdown, 13 J. FAtN. L. 443, 446 (1973). See Glendon, Marriage and
the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv. 663, 704-05 (1976).
94. 123/329 (base is less than 331 due to exclusion of two files for which data were
inadvertently omitted).
95. And one of these was signed only by the attorneys for the parties, contrary to
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-48(a) (1975).
96. Of 830 uncontested dissolutions heard in New Haven during the period studied
for the Project, there were no decree denials noted in the court calendar records. The
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parties is illustrated by the fact that more than half of the lawyer-
initiated files contained neither a stipulation nor a list of available
witnesses.
97
Following the hearing, the plaintiff or his lawyer must complete
and submit three copies of a decree form, using either Form JDSR-
214 (if the defendant did not file an appearance) or Form JDSR-213
(if he did).0 * Blanks are provided for the nature of the award approved
at the hearing and the name of the presiding judge. The lawyer-
initiated sample produced two decrees with the wrong name affixed.
In both instances, the incorrectly identified judge cured these defects
by signing the document, despite the fact that he had not heard the
case.
This progression exhausts the form preparation responsibilities of
an attorney or pro se plaintiff in all cases involving neither minor
children, a financial award, or an out-of-state plaintiff.99 And these
three complicating considerations add only incrementally to the num-
ber of standardized documents required. If there are minor children,
an affidavit must be filed "averring that there is no proceeding pend-
ing in any other court affecting the custody of such children."' 00 As
with most dissolution papers, a standardized form plus a signature
effects compliance. 101 This requirement went unmet in 26% of the
New Haven lawyer-initiated divorces involving children, 0 2 and 56.5%
of the Bridgeport cases' 03 ignored it.104
two legal aid attorne)s interviewed for the Project, drawing upon three years of high-
volume divorce practice, could recall only one uncontested divorce which had been
denied in either of their presences. Telephone Interview with-David Snyder, supra note
53; Telephone Interview with Mary Keller, former New Haven Legal Assistance attorney
(Jan. 30, 1976) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal). In that single instance, the
anomalous judge was later persuaded by the (private) attorneys for the parties to let the
case go off the calendar for that day instead of recording the denial, so that they could
reclaim it later before a different judge. Id.
97. Sixty-three percent (206/329) of the lawyer-initiated files lacked stipulations, and
of these, only 16.5% contained lists of witnesses. (Base is less than 331 due to the ex-
clusion of two files for which data were inadvertently omitted.)
98. See CONNECrICUT PRAcrICE BOOK § 374 (1975). The cited forms appear in the
Practice Book as Forms 490 and 490A.
99. To facilitate recordkeeping, Connecticut imposes the additional minor require-
ment that all divorce parties or their attorneys supply certain basic demographic in-
formation on standardized Form VS-63. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-64 (1975).
100. CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 394B (1975).
101. E.g., CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK ANN. Form 396.9 (Supp. 1975). See Appendix 6.
102. There were 76 cases involving minor children in the New Haven lawyer-initiated
sample.
103. There were 85 cases involving minor children in the Bridgeport lawyer-initiated
sample.
104. This apparent ignorance of the rules of practice may be attributable in part to
the recent origin of CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 394B (1975), which took effect on
Oct. 1, 1974. But divorce kits have been criticized and sometimes banned in part because
of an ostensible concern that changes in procedural law might result in errors by users
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For actions in which either party desires an award of "alimony,
support, or counsel fees," a sworn statement "substantially in accord
with Form 379A" must be filed by "every party who has appeared." 105
Form 379A is a two-page summary of current income, assets, expenses,
and liabilities which is considerably less intimidating than the Internal
Revenue Service's 1040 Form.10 6 As to the final "complicating" factor,
an out-of-state spouse, the sole addition to the dissolution portfolio is
one of two sets of standardized forms effecting service by registered
mail, if the defendant's address is known, or service by publication,
if his whereabouts are uncertain.
10 7
In sum, it is highly doubtful that either judicial administration or
public welfare considerations justify prohibition of lay advice or
clerical help in the preparation of the "legal instruments" required in
uncontested dissolutions. Lay specialists and plaintiffs using published
kits may, like the sampled lawyers, make occasional errors. But cor-
rections are easily effected, and opportunities for truly damaging mis-
haps are virtually nonexistent. 08 Where the parties agree on custody,
finances, and the necessity for a divorce, guidance concerning pro-
cedural formalities need not be the exclusive province of lawyers.
Nor does the presence of an attorney appear necessary at the single
brief hearing required for an uncontested dissolution, Since grounds
for the divorce can readily be established by the plaintiff's uncor-
of out-of-date kits. See Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 1974). It suffices
to note that the lawyer monopoly is evidently not a reliable antidote. Moreover, the
presence of such a high volume of mistakes in concluded files is a testament to the
negligible significance of procedural errors. There is no indication that the missing af-
fidavits were even noticed. And it is hardly conceivable that any judge would allow such
an omission to influence his view of the equity of a proposed settlement.
105. CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 380 (1975). Since nonappearing defendants are not
required to complete the form, judges frequently approve awards with only the plaintiff's
affidavit at hand. In 22% (39/178) of the cases in which alimony and/or child support
awards of at least $5 per week were made, the judge had only one (and in one case no)
sworn affidavit to assist his determination of the fairness of the settlement presented.
106. Form 379A is reproduced in Appendix 6.
107. The requisite Forms JDSR-909 and JDSR-906 are conveniently kept available for
practitioners at all superior court clerks' offices, and are reprinted in PRO SE DISSOLUTION
GROUP, supra note 68, at 24-25. Service by registered mail was successfully engineered by
seven of the pro se plaintiffs in the sample. Service by publication entails a brief court
hearing following the completion of the two forms.
108. In New Haven, for example, a defective pleading is mailed back to the attorney
or pro se plaintiff filing it, with the type of error found checked off on a standardized
form. See Appendix 6. For a description of the inconsequential burden placed upon
court clerks by pro se plaintiff errors in Oregon, see Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538
P.2d 913, 917 (Or. App. 1975). See also note 104 supra.
Mitch Buszek, a spokesman for the California Divorce League's 21 lay assistance offices,
stated in a 1976 interview that after three years of operations "'we've never made a
mistake we couldn't rectify. . . . If we make a mistake, and it's our fault, we pay legal
expenses. We've never had to do this.'" Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 1976, at I, col. 1, and 5,
col. 2.
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roborated testimony, there is little need for courtroom finesse. Notably,
the average duration of hearings timed by the authors in Bridgeport
and New Haven was four minutes. 0 9 Cases in which no financial
awards were made usually required less than three minutes, while cases
featuring such awards typically lasted about 51/2 minutes. Five pro
se divorce hearings consumed a total of 13 minutes. In these limited
intervals little transpired beyond a brief review of the facts set forth
in the complaint and the cause of the marital breakdown. If there was
a support or property award, plaintiffs were sometimes queried by the
judge as to whether they were satisfied with it.
2. Ancillary Legal Issues
Opponents of lay divorce establishments frequently assert that, form
processing aside, there are important legal considerations inherent in
most divorces which require a lawyer's attention:
In most instances, the basic need [for an attorney] is there. Court
procedures can and should be simplified, but the complicated
questions of divorce have always centered around issues of prop-
erty and parental responsibility. 1 0
The Florida Supreme Court's decision to prohibit published form
processing advice emphasized that "dissolution of marriage covers a
wide range of subjects, including contract and property rights of the
parties, custody of children, inheritance, alimony, separate property.""'
Other commentators maintain that "virtually all divorces have some
tax implications" 112 and that simplified formal requirements are "only
the tip of the iceberg in divorce proceedings .... [T]he basic problems
are much more complex."
1
As policy arguments for protecting the public against lay form
processing assistance, these assertions are flawed in two respects. First,
in many jurisdictions laymen with businesses unrelated to do-it-your-
109. These averages are computed from 35 hearings timed in Bridgeport and New
Haven before three different judges. Eighteen of the cases (51%) involved property or
support awards. Five plaintiffs represented themselves. In lieu of responding to attorney
queries as to their age, date and place of marriage, and grounds for divorce, they read
their testimony from prepared notes.
110. M. WHEELER, supra note 16, at 129. For other recitals of complications potentially
imperiling pro se divorce litigants, see Marine, Do-It-Yourself Divorce-Wisconsin-
Update, 38 UNAUTH. PR-c. NEvs 131, 132 (1974), and an unauthorized practice complaint
filed in Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Bratt, Civ. No. C50833 (Dist. Ct. Denver, Colo., filed Dec.
14, 1974), reprinted in Colorado Bar Association Starts Suit Against Lay Divorce Special-
ists, 39 UNAUTH. PRPc. NEws 87, 89-90 (1975).
111. Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 1974).
112. Meeker, supra note 63, at 219.
113. Resh, supra note 77, at 23.
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self divorce have long been permitted to give advice concerning many
of the financial and parental issues cited above." 4 Second, any pro se
plaintiff desiring a lawyer's expertise concerning such questions can
readily secure it at prevailing hourly rates."n  Lay form processing
does not preclude consultation with a lawyer. Rather, it leaves parties
with the option to secure attorney advice priced at a fraction of the




Conceivably, however, the prohibition of lay assistance could be
defended as a device to force all divorcing parties to secure the benefits
of legal consultation regarding financial and parental matters. The
Project's data suggest that the actual attorney contributions to ancillary
legal issues are too infrequent and insubstantial to support such a
justification for the form-processing monopoly. This conclusion is
supported below with a presentation of divorce file and client inter-
view data, organized to elucidate both the contours of the financial/
parental settlements reached in the sampled actions and the magnitude
of attorney contributions to these dispositions."17 Data regarding the
content of settlements were obtained from the decrees and separation
agreements in the surveyed lawyer-initiated files.
a. Divorce Decrees
Following a dissolution hearing, the plaintiff or his attorney submits
a decree for ratification by the presiding judge."5 This document
functions not only as the official order dissolving the marriage, but
also as a vehicle for the formal allocation of financial and parental
rights between the parties. The terms of the decree are enforceable by
114. A numnber of these putatively legal tasks are now performed by la)men under
the incidental services exemption, which is part of the unauthorized practice doctrine in
many states. See p. 112 supra. Thus, real estate transfers pursuant to divorce can often
be handled by realtors, and tax problems can be taken to accountants.
115. Three New Haven kit purchasers interviewed for the Project volunteered that
they had disposed of their houses with the help of realtors or attorneys before pursuing
their divorces pro se.
116. Ralph Nader reports attorney charges for superintending uncontested dissolutions
of S250 to over S750. Standard hourly fees range from ;25-;50, for small firms and young
attorneys, to S75-SI00, for large firms and experienced attorneys. Ralph Nader Reports,
supra note 20, at 36. See D. VILLIAMS S P. BLACK, supra note 31, at 2 ("If you believe
there are or may be significant tax questions involved in your situation, consult a
qualified tax accountant or an attorney who is well versed in tax law, to go over your
separation agreement. The cost should be a fraction of an average divorce fee."); note
205 infra.
117. Ethical considerations precluded the use of the lawyer questionnaires to supple-
ment file and interview data on specific divorce cases. ABA CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1975).
118. Connecticut's decree form is described at p. 127 supra.
130
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contempt citation.1 19 Tables 1 and 2 summarize the content of the
sampled decrees.
TABLE 1
Divorce Decrees in Lawyer-Initiated Cases: Financial Awards
A. OVERVIEW (n=331)
Type of Award Relative Frequency
1. No Property," Alimony, :  or
Child Support Award 37.1%
2. Property Award Only 6.0%
3. Alimony Award Only 7.3%
4. Child Support Award Only 8.5%
5. Award in Two Categories 36.0%
6. Award in All Three Categories 5.1%
*Included under the "property" rubric are judgment provisions allocating real prop-
erty, personal property, or debts of the spouses.
""Alimony" includes both lump sum and periodic payments. Three judgments
awarded both; in general, there was a strong preference for periodic payments.
B. DETAILED BREAKDOWN (n-331)
Type of Award Relative Frequency
I. Property Award 23.9%
a. Awards Mentioning Houses 18.0%
b. Awards Mentioning Automobiles (n=328)' 7.3%
c. Awards Mentioning Both Houses and
Automobiles (n=328)' 4.6%
d. Awards Mentioning Debts (n=328)' 6.7%
2. Alimony Award 42.3%
a. Lump Sum Alimony 9.1%
1. $I-5000 6.9%
2. $5001+ 2.1%
b. Periodic Alimony 34.1%
1. $1/yr (n-329)' 13.4%
2. $5-50/wk (n=329)' 15.8%
3. $51+/wk (n-329)' 4.6%
3. Child Support Award* 42.9%
a. $25/wk or less (n=326)' 11.6%
b. 26-50/wk (n=326)2 16.3%
c. $51-+/wk (n=326)' 14.1%
a Base is less than 331 due to the exclusion of files for which data were inadvertently
omitted.
* Child support awards were included in the divorce decrees of 142 of the 161 cases
involving minor children. (Base is less than 162 due to the exclusion of one file for
which data were inadvertently omitted).
119. Connecticut's Dissolution of Marriage Act encourages use of the contempt
remedy for decree violations by directing the award of court fees to successful petitioners.
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TABLE 2
Divorce Decrees in Lawyer-Initiated Cases Involving
Minor Children: Parental Rights and Obligations (n=162)
Categoly Relative Frequency
1. Custody (n=161)'
a. To Wife 90.1%
b. To Husband 5.6%
c. Joint 4.3%
2. Visitation
a. Not Mentioned 5.5%
b. Granted but not Detailed 86.5%
c. Detailed 8.0%
3. Education (n=159)'
a. Not Mentioned 89.9%
b. Voluntary Payments 3.1%
c. Mandatory Payments 6.9%
4. Medical Insurance Coverage for Children 54.3%
5. Life Insurance Coverage with Children as Beneficiaries 17.3%
Base is less than 162 due to the exclusion of files for which data were inadvertently
omitted.
Certain of the categories merit elaboration. Notably, over one-third
of the decrees contained no financial allocation of any kind. Periodic
alimony awards, although fairly common, served mainly as a supple-
ment to child support; it was granted in only 20 (12.0%) of 1671' 0
childless 121 dispositions. Seven of these orders were nominal $1 per
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-56 (1975). Elsewhere, the scope of the contempt sanction has been
limited by some courts, due to concern about constitutional prohibitions against im-
prisonment for debt. See, e.g., Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 509, 522, 310 P.2d
634, 642 (1957) (Adjustment of property interests "should be held to fall within the
[state] constitutional proscription against imprisonment for debt."); Corbin v. Etheridge,
296 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1973) (mortgage payment mandated in decree constitutes debt, and
sanction of imprisonment therefore not available). However, the Reporter for the Com-
mittee on Uniform Marriage and Divorce Laws maintains that such constructions are
"neither persuasive nor widely enough accepted to override the acknowledged utility of
the contempt weapon," and he concludes that "the ability to enforce the financial
aspects of divorce decrees by means of the contempt citation is vital to the recipient
spouse." R. LEVY, supra note 5, at 171.
120. Base is less than 169 due to the exclusion of two files for which data were in-
advertently omitted.
121. "Childless" divorces refer to those not involving minor children. The Connecticut
Dissolution of Marriage Act contains no provisions relative to the rights and duties of
parents toward children past the age of majority. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-42 (1975).
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year allocations, -12 2 and 11 went to women whose marriages were
terminating after 20 years or more. Alimony and child support awards
when present were generally modest. Property provisions were present
in less than one-quarter of the decrees and dealt principally with houses
and automobiles..2 3 There were virtually no references to divisions of
personal property.
124
Table 2 indicates the extent to which the decrees in lawyer-initiated
actions delineated parental rights and obligations. With a few in-
significant exceptions, it was possible to subsume all references to
parental matters under one of the table's five categories.' 2 5 As can be
seen, few judgments went much beyond allocation of custody and a
general reference to visitation in their treatment of parental interests.
Visitation rights of the noncustodial spouse were detailed in a small
minority of cases. For the rest, the phrases "reasonable rights of
visitation" and, occasionally, "liberal rights of visitation" constituted
the sole contribution made by the decree to laying a foundation for
future parent-child interaction. 2 Intermittently, the reasonable or
liberal rights were tempered by the admonition that the visitor could
exercise them only if "sober." Education was for the most part left
untreated, and one-third of the handful of judgments which did men-
tion the subject committed the husband to contribute funds "if he
deems it within his financial ability to do S0.127 Less than one-fifth
of the judgments mentioned life insurance. 128 Maintenance of existing
medical insurance policies covering minor children was directed in
slightly over half the cases involving children; no judgment mandated
that new or expanded coverage be secured.
122. The one-dollar-per-year awards are not without utility, since like any other order
for periodic alimony payments they may be modified "at any time .. upon a showing
of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party." Id. § 46-54. Modification is
precluded only if the decree so provides. Id.
123. Only 28.'% (22/76) of the property provisions contained a reference to debts.
(Base is less than 79 due to the exclusion of three files with property provisions for
which content summaries were inadvertently omitted.)
124. Except for automobiles (mentioned in 31.6% (24/76) of the property awards),
and in one case a horse, personal property was uniformly ignored in the decrees. (Base
is less than 79 due to the exclusion of three files with property provisions for which
content summaries were inadvertently omitted.)
125. Three decrees incorporating unconventional separation agreement provisions
dealing with children are described in note 138 infra.
126. One decree provided an equally unilluminating alternative wording: "week night
visitation upon agreement of the parties."
127. These provisions constitute the "voluntary payments" category listed under
"Education" in Table 2 supra.
128. One such provision required the husband to maintain life insurance coverage for
his children as long as he was employed by a company at which "he is entitled to free
life insurance."
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b. Separation Agreements
The judicial decree need not be the only divorce document that
treats the ancillary matters discussed above. The parties may also
execute a contract, or "separation agreement," which can be em-
ployed to govern their relationship prior to the rendering of the
decree and to allocate financial and parental rights in greater detail
than the judicial orders described in the preceding section.' -' Such
agreements are binding upon the signatories (subject to the possibility
of judicial nullificationl 30 ), but are not necessarily enforceable by
contempt citation.
1 3 1
Judging from the files sampled for the Project, separation agree-
ments do not reflect a major attorney contribution to the dissolution
process. Such agreements were filed in only 27% of the lawyer-initiated
actions. -32 Their substantive provisions usually served only as templates
for clauses in the decrees that followed soon after. Connecticut's Dis-
solution of Marriage Act directs judges to incorporate in the decree all
separation agreement provisions "concerning the custody, care, educa-
tion, visitation, maintenance or support of any . . . children or con-
cerning alimony or the disposition of property" that are found to be
"fair and equitable."' 33 While most of the sampled agreements set
129. Of course, decrees for cases wherein detailed separation agreements have been
filed usually incorporate many or all of the contract provisions. See pp. 134-35 infra.
130. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-49 (1975).
131. The contempt sanction is only available if the judge incorporates agreement
provisions in the decree of divorce. See R. LLvY, supra note 5, at 196-98. For unin-
corporated provisions, the remedy for violations lies in "a separate contract action."
Schoonmaker & Balbirer, supra note 85, at 21.
132. There is some indication, however, that this figure understates the total number
of agreements prepared. The superior court files for interviewed clients recorded a total
of 35 separation agreements, )et 55 respondents reported having signed such agreements.
To be sure, some of the discrepancy may be attributable to clients confusing deeds or
stipulations of irretrievable breakdown with separation agreements. Even so, the sub-
stantial disparity between file and interview accounts suggests that a number of agree-
ments were executed but never made available for judicial scrutiny. Although the
relevant Connecticut statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-49 (1975), does not expressly require
that agreements be filed, two prominent state family law specialists argue that "counsel
are under a duty to advise the court of the existence of any 'written agreement.'" Mc-
Anerney & Schoonmaker, Connecticut's New Approach to Marriage Dissolution, 47
CONN. B.J. 375, 410 (1973).
Ethical considerations aside, failure to file deprives beneficiaries of the opportunity to
secure incorporation of agreement provisions in the decree. Incorporation creates the
possibility of enforcement through contempt sanctions, see note 131 supra, and is a
"prerequisite" to expedited interstate recognition of awards under the Uniform Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments Act, which has been adopted by many states. See Schoon-
maker & Balbirer, supra note 85, at 22. Even if a judge declines to incorporate provisions
in a separation agreement, he can confer formal "approval" upon them, foreclosing sub-
sequent litigation alleging fraud, mistake, or undue influence. See Propper, The Judg-
went of Dissolution and the Agreement-Incorporation, Merger, Integration and Ap-
proval, 51 L.A.B.J. 177, 178 (1975).
133. CONN. GEN. STA.T. § 46-49 (1975).
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forth support allocations, and more than half noted the consummation
or imminence of real property transfers, 34 all such references reap-
peared verbatim in the decree for the case. Moreover, agreements were
not particularly useful as instruments for fixing obligations in the
period preceding issuance of the decree, since a majority were signed
30 days or less before the final hearing.135
As to personal property and debts, areas left untreated by most
decrees,13 more than half the separation agreements were effectively
silent, as is illustrated in Table 3 below. The personal property
provisions characterized in Table 3 as "pro forma" employed un-
illuminating language epitomized by the following quotations:
Each party shall own, free of any claim or right of the other, all
of the items of property, real, personal, and mixed . . . which are
now owned by him or her ....
Upon the execution of the written agreement, the husband and
wife shall each become the sole owner of all personal property in
their respective possession.
Even agreements classified in the "detailed treatment" category made
frequent use of such unenlightening references as "a fair division of
the pots and pans as agreed upon."
Regarding joint and individual debt obligations, Table 3 reveals
that less than one separation agreement in five (involving 4.6% of
the sampled divorces) provided for a specified division of outstanding
family financial obligations.' 37 One-third of the agreements made no
provision for debts, and almost half were classified as "pro forma" by
virtue of their stylized announcement that there were no debts to
divide.
134. Fifty-four percent (44/81) of the separation agreements made reference to real
property transfers. (Base is less than 89 due to the exclusion of four files for which data
were inadvertently omitted and to the failure of attorneys in four instances to submit full
copies of separation agreements to the court.) Sixty-four percent of these provisions
directed or recorded the consummation of a quitclaim transfer of one spouse's interest,
while the remainder usually required a sale of the property and division of the proceeds.
Where couples agree upon the disposition of their house, the necessary arrangements
could be made through a real estate broker or a single consultation with an attorney.
135. Almost one-quarter of the agreements (19/80) were signed within three days of
the hearing. (Base is less than 89 due to the exclusion of five files for which data were
inadwertently omitted and to the failure of attorneys in four instances to submit full
copies of separation agreements to the court.)
136. An entrenched judicial unwillingness to include personal property allocations in
decrees, described in Schoonmaker & Balbirer, supra note 85, at 20-21, leaves a void
which could to some extent be filled by separation agreements.
137. One of those so providing stated that the "husband will pay the wife - to
adjust household bills." The relevant sum was not affixed to the copy of the agreement
filed with the court.
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TABLE 3
Treatment of Personal Property and Debt
Allocations in Separation Agreements (n=89)
Type of Treatment Relative Frequency
A. Detailed Division




3. Both Personal Property and Debts* 6.0%
(n=83)'
4. Either Personal Property or Debts* 47.0%
(n=83)*
B. Pro Forma Treatment









Of the entire sample of lawyer-initiated files, 1.5% (5/325) contained separation
agreements fixing a detailed division of both personal property and debts. Twelve per-
cent (39/325) of the lawyer-initiated files contained separation agreements making de-
tailed provision for either personal property or debts. (Base is less than 331 due to the
exclusion of files for which data were inadvertently omitted and to the failure of at-
torneys in four instances to submit full copies of separation agreements to the court.)
Base is less than 89 due to the exclusion of files for which data were inadvertently
omitted and to the failure of attorneys in four instances to submit full copies of separa-
tion agreements to the court.
In the area of parental rights, few separation agreements made con-
tributions that were not fully replicated in the judicial decree for
the case.138 Where agreements established detailed visitation rights,
education-related responsibilities, or life insurance obligations, those
provisions were almost uniformly incorporated in the succeeding
138. Among the rare nonredundant clauses were two pledges of summer camp ex-
penditures "if summer camp is beneficial for the children," and one delegation of
prospective disputes over a vaguely delineated joint custody award to the American
Arbitration Association.
136
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decree. 130 Not redundant, but of questionable significance, were
numerous boilerplate clauses pledging parents "not to hamper the
free and natural development of the children's love and respect for
the other party."
Most separation agreements consisted primarily of extended form
clauses with such titles as Parties to Live Separate and Apart, No
Molestation, No Duress, Absolute Waiver of Marital Rights,140 Non-
merger in Judgment,' 4 ' Law of Connecticut to Govern, and Para-
graph Headings for Descriptive Purposes Only.142 These progressions
of "legalese," as many interviewed clients characterized them, con-
stitute at best a limited contribution to ancillary legal issues.
c. Legal Advice Regarding Ancillary Issues
The Project's client interviews indicate that attorney guidance did
not play a major role in the shaping of the decrees and agreements
139. Connecticut law mandates incorporation of visitation and education provisions,
provided that the judge deems them "fair and equitable." See p. 134 supra. The
agreements sampled for the Project contained a total of 11 pledges for education-related
payments and eight detailed visitation references, all of which were subsequently in-
corporated in the divorce decrees for the relevant cases. Nineteen of 23 life insurance
provisions (82.6%) were incorporated.
140. Many attorneys exhausted several double-spaced pages waiving "Marital Rights"
which accrue only upon the death of a spouse and would disappear in any event once the
dissolution was granted. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-12 (1975). Typical waivers were those
of dower, thirds, curtesy, statutory allowance, widow's allowance, homestead rights, rights
to take in intestacy, right to take against the will of the other, and right to act as
administrator of the other's estate. These provisions would be meaningful only if the
beneficiary of the waiver died during the interval between agreement execution and the
decree. The median lapse between agreement and decree was less than 30 days. See p.
135 supra.
141. With the consent of the judge who presides at the dissolution hearing, a
separation agreement providing for "merger" in the decree abandons its status as a
contract and becomes enforceable through judgment remedies. An unmerged agreement
remains, at least in theory, an instrument independent of the decree, and its provisions
can only be enforced by a contract action. Propper, supra note 132, at 177-78, 183. Since
judgment remedies are generally swifter and less expensive than contract remedies, see
note 132 supra, and since any agreement provisions regarding support and property are
virtually certain to be carried over into the decree whether or not merger is expressly
provided for, see pp. 134-35 supra, the utility of nonmerger clauses is unclear. One com-
mentator has suggested that unmerged agreement provisions fixing alimony payments
can be used to frustrate judicial modifications of the decree's alimony award, on the
assumption that the contract can be sued on even after the decree has been changed.
Propper, supra note 132, at 183. No cases are cited in support of this proposition, and at
least one court has maintained that an unmerged agreement cannot "prevent later court
modification of the [alimony] terms when need appears." McMains v. McMains, 15 N.Y.2d
283, 287, 206 N.E.2d 185, 188, 258 N.Y.S.2d 93, 97 (1965). In any case, the subterfuge is
unnecesary in Connecticut and other jurisdictions which permit the parties to preclude
alimony modifications by inserting appropriate language in the decree itself. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46-54 (1975); Propper, supra note 132, at 183-84.
142. One attorney constructed a 17-page agreement out of such clauses for a couple
with no children, no alimony payments, and no specified property or debts to divide.
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reviewed above. Over 60%71 3 of the interviewed plaintiffs stated that
they and their spouses had independently resolved all property, sup-
port, custody, and visitation issues; of these, only three indicated that
they had restructured their agreements in response to lawyer sugges-
tions. This low incidence of lawyer involvement is all the more strik-
ing because the interviewed client group had a higher percentage of
decrees with financial awards than the lawyer-initiated sample as a
whole and did not overrepresent childless couples.
44
These findings strongly suggest that judicially acceptable awards can
readily be crafted without legal assistance. This hypothesis is further
supported by a review of statutory guidelines for alimony, child sup-
port, property, and custody in Connecticut and other no-fault juris-
dictions. Cast for the most part in vague and conclusory language,
these statutes provide no specific goal toward which divorcing couples
must be steered.1 45 In Connecticut the judge presiding at a dissolution
hearing is directed to approve the parties' oral or written agTeement
concerning financial or parental affairs if he finds it "fair and
equitable under all the circumstances."' 46 Given the scope of this
standard, it is to be expected that many divorce settlements could pass
judicial muster without benefit of a lawyer's intervention.
Although attorneys are often not essential to the preparation of
legally sufficient settlements, it might nonetheless be suggested that
their presence ensures useful attention to issues that may be over-
looked by the nonlawyer. Insofar as this argument rests upon the in-
sertion of extra detail into decrees and separation agreements, it is
unsupported by the data. Only 25.7% of the lawyer-initiated files con-
tained decrees or agreements which included one or more of the follow-
ing: (a) provision for life insurance; (b) detailed visitation rights; (c)
imposition of responsibility for financing education of minor children;
(d) detailed allocation of personal property; (e) detailed division of
143. 58/96 (base is less than 99 due to exclusion of cases in which no response was
given).
Those client responses that did indicate some degree of attorney involvement are
analyzed at pp. 144-45 infra.
144. See Table B, note 62 supra.
145. E.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A: 34-23 (Supp. 1975) ("IT]he court may make such order
as to the alimony or maintenance of the parties, and also as to the care, custody, educa-
tion and maintenance of the children . . . as the circumstances of the parties and the
nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable, and just .... "); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 292 (1974) ("T]he court may make such . . . decree as it deems expedient concerning
the care, custody and maintenance of the minor children .... ") Criteria in a number
of other no-fault jurisdictions, frequently extending no further than a requirement that
settlements be "just," are discussed in Foster & Freed, Economic Effects of Divorce, 7
FAta. L.Q 275 (1973); and Zuckerman 9- Fox, The Ferment in Divorce Legislation, 12 J.
FAM. L. 515, 565-71 (1973).
146. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-49 (1975).
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debts. For parties whose divorces involved minor children, only
30.4% 147 of the relevant lawyer-initiated files indicated attention to
any of these matters.
There remains one potential contribution, tax advice, the prevalence
of which cannot be gauged from the divorce file data.148 As noted
earlier, the lawyer's monopoly over form processing has sometimes been
justified in part by the need to ensure that tax counsel is afforded to
all divorcing parties. This argument presupposes that such information
is customarily disseminated under the present structure; data from
the client interviews undermine that assumption.
Interviewed clients were asked if their attorneys had provided advice
on tax matters arising out of the divorce. 149 Seventy-nine percent 50
answered in the negative. 151 Significantly, whether a plaintiff received
tax advice did not correlate with whether his divorce had generated
financial awards; 76.2% 152 of those in the latter category received no
147. 49/161 (base is less than 162 due to exclusion of file for which a datum was in-
advertently omitted).
148. The only relevant file data arc derived from separation agreements, 28.9% (24/83)
of which made some reference to income tax matters. (Base is less than 89 due to the
exclusion of two files for which data were inadvertently omitted and to the failure of
attorneys in four instances to submit full copies of separation agreements to the court.)
Typically the relevant contract terms provided for filing of joint income tax returns as
long as the parties remained married, and in some cases the disposition of refund checks
was settled. Several agreements allowed the husband to claim his children as deductions
"if permissible under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code." Two pledged the spouses to file
joint income tax returns "if legal," and another ordered the husband not to deduct his
alimony payments and the wife not to declare them oir their respective federal income
tax returns. The latter arrangement would have been permissible only prior to the
Revenue Act of 1942. See Young, Tax Problems Involved in Divorce, 1949 U. ILL. L.F.
670, 670-71 (1949). See generally I.R.C. §§ 71, 215.
149. Lawyers were not asked to estimate the percentage of uncontested cases in which
they gave tax advice. However, only five attorneys volunteered tax counsel as one of the
lawyer's most important divorce functions. See Table 4, p. 141 infra.
150. 76/96 (base is less than 99 due to exclusion of three interviews in which no
response was given).
151. It could be argued that even where no oral advice is given to clients, attorneys
often craft financial settlements with significant tax considerations in mind. Although
this possibility exists, it is troubling that explanations were so infrequently given,
especially since apparently the one tax deductible portion of a divorce attorney's fee is
his charge for tax advice. Meeker, supra note 63, at 239 (citing I.R.C. § 212(3) and
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962)). And of course no such unarticulated assistance
could have been extended to the many parties whose divorces involved no financial
settlement. See Table 1, p. 131 supra.
Further, there is some evidence that lawyer manipulations of settlements for tax
advantages were .infrequent in the sampled actions. All but one of the lawyer-initiated
cases which involved children and made provision for their maintenance earmarked a
specific sum for "child support." Yet an arrangement which commingles child support
and alimony in undifferentiated payments may frequently yield considerable net" tax
savings to a divorced couple. See Basi & Weinstein, supra note 63, at 139-40.
152. 48/63 (base less than 65 due to exclusion of two interviews in which no response
was given).
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advice. Also unadvised were 78.7%a3 of the plaintiffs with chil-
dren.1 54 Six respondents volunteered that they had to consult ac-
countants for needed information.
The Project's data on ancillary issues do not negate the possibility
that lawyers can render useful contributions in many divorce proceed-
ings. The results strongly suggest, however, that the form-processing
monopoly protected by unauthorized practice doctrine is an expensive
and unreliable means of ensuring that those contributions are made.
3. Summary of Findings Relevant to
Unauthorized Practice Doctrine
A number of potential justifications for the lawyer's monopoly over
divorce form processing have been considered. Clearly, professional
expertise is not a prerequisite for the completion of dissolution forms.
Discretion in form selection and preparation is minimal, and errors
are either readily correctible or inconsequential. No aspect of these
activities demands the safeguards of a fiduciary relationship.' Nor is
153. 37/47 (base less than 49 due to exclusion of two interviews in which no response
was given).
154. Table F demonstrates that, according to the interviewed clients, neither children,
home ownership, nor a joint annual income in excess of $15,000 typically prompted tax
advice. Only for those cases in which all three were present does the proportion of
clients receiving such advice exceed one-third.
TABLE F
Tax Advice by Presence of Children, Houses, and/or Joint Annual
Income in Excess of $15,000
Characteristic Relative Frequency of Tax Advice
Children Involved (n=47) _  21.3%
No Children (n-47)b  21.3%
Home Owned (n=55), 32.7%
No Home Owned (n=40)d 5.0%
Joint Income Greater than $15,000 (n=36)0 33.3%
Joint Income Less than $15,000 (n=58)f 13.8%
Children, Home, and Joint Income Greater than S15,000 (n= 13) 53.8%
Interviews in which no response was given to a particular question have been deleted
from the computations, as indicated below:
Base is less than 49 due to the exclusion of two interviews.
b Base is less than 50 due to the exclusion of three interviews.
Base is less than 56 due to the exclusion of one interview.
d Base is less than 43 due to the exclusion of three interviews.
"Base is less than 37 due to the exclusion of one interview.
'Base is less than 60 due to the exclusion of two interviews.
155. Fiduciary considerations constitute the lynchpin of judicial differentiations be-
tween published and personalized divorce assistance. See note 50 s'.pra. In view of the
rudimentary nature of the "legal" documents prerequisite to an uncontested dissolution,
there seems no reason to compel plaintiffs to pay for the establishment of a fiduciary
relation if they do not desire one.
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the character of uncontested hearings such as to necessitate an at-
torney's superintending presence.
Only if the lawyer monopoly serves some auxiliary purpose, tran-
scending the document preparation with which unauthorized practice
doctrine is nominally concerned, can the present limitations on pro se
assistance be defended. Ancillary financial and parental issues cannot
be cited to buttress the lawyer's procedural monopoly, absent evidence
that the monopoly enhances useful legal dispositions of those issues.
The Project data provide no such evidence. In any event, parties in
need of legal advice on ancillary matters could usually reap substan-
tial savings by consulting attorneys on these questions, while relying on
kits or lay advisors for help with the formal requisites of an uncon-
tested divorce.
III. Negotiation and Personal Counseling
In response to the Project questionnaire's inquiry regarding "the
lawyer's most important functions in an uncontested divorce action,"
few attorneys adverted to any of the tasks emphasized in unauthorized
practice opinions, such as form preparation, tax advice, and delineation
of parental responsibilities. As Table 4 demonstrates, the contributions
most frequently cited were negotiation and personal counseling. Since
neither is solely within the province of attorneys, these activities have
not figured prominently in the unauthorized practice controversy.
Nevertheless, because of the high priority assigned to them by re-
spondent attorneys, negotiation and personal counseling are analyzed
in this section as potential policy reasons for preserving the lawyer
monopoly.
TABLE 4
Functions Cited by Attorneys as "Most Important"






Defining Parental Rights 2.0%
Drafting Separation Agreement 1.0%
* Base is less than 106 due to the exclusion of questionnaires in which no response
was given.
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Lawyers were also questioned as to the percentage of their uncon-
tested divorces that "involved substantive disputes" requiring them
"to negotiate an agreement" in the areas of alimony, child support,
division of property, and custody/visitation. According to most re-
spondents, negotiation over both support orders and property was
necessary in more than 60% of their cases.1a5 Reported frequencies for
custody and visitation disputes were much lower, although about one-
fifth of the lawyers stated that such problems arose in more than 40%
of their uncontested actions.' 57
156. Table G summarizes lawyer estimates of the percentage of their uncontested
divorce cases requiring significant negotiation efforts. As is evident, reports by attorneys
who handled more than 10 divorces for plaintiffs per year did not differ markedly from
those for the sample as a whole.
TABLE G
Percentage of Uncontested Divorces Requiring Negotiations:
Lawyer Questionnaire Respondents
Attorneys Handling
More than 10 Uncon-
tested Divorces for



















40-60% 14.3% 13.0% b
60-80% 36.2% 31.5%b
80-100% 35.2% 40.7% b






For subcategories A, B, and C, base is 105 due to the exclusion of one questionnaire
in which no response was given.
b Base is 54 due to exclusion of one questionnaire in which no response was given.
157. See note 156 supra.
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Not surprisingly, in light of these response patterns, most lawyers
indicated that by far the most time-consuming aspects of their uncon-
tested divorce practices were client conferences and negotiations. At-
torneys were asked to estimate the average number of personal and
phone contacts with their clients and the average amount of time spent
negotiating with the defendant's lawyer. Almost half the respondents
stated that in a typical uncontested case they had four or more per-
sonal conferences and seven or more telephone conversations with
their client between the initial interview and the final hearing; the
average negotiation estimate was in excess of four hours per action.
Both client contact and negotiation estimates were even higher for
lawyers reporting above average (for the sample) numbers of divorces
involving children and disputes over property.' 5s
158. Forty-eight percent (47/99) of the lawyers reported more than three personal
interviews and six phone conversations, on the average, with uncontested divorce plain-
tiffs. (Base is less than 106 due to the exclusion of seven questionnaires in which no
response was given.) Table H divides attorneys according to the percentage of their cases
asserted to involhe property disputes or children, and indicates the number of lawyers
in each group who stated that they typically exceeded the three personal, six phone
contact level.
TABLE H




Lawyer's Description of and More Than Six
His Divorce Practice Phone Contacts
0-60% of Divorces Handled Involve
Children (n=30)a 30.0%
60-100% of Divorces Handled Involve
Children (n=69)b 55.1%
0-60% of Divorces Handled Require
Negotiations Over Property (n=37)' 32.4%
60-100% of Divorces Handled Require
Negotiations Over Property (n=62)d 54.8%
a Base is less than 33 due to the exclusion of three questionnaires in which no response
was given.
b Base is less than 73 due to the c*xclusion of four questionnaires in which no response
was given.
c Base is less than 41 due to the exclusion of four questionnaires in which no response
was given.
d Base is less than 64 due to the exclusion of two questionnaires in which no response
was given.
Table I reveals a comparable distribution of responses with respect to negotiation time
estimates. Lawyers reporting relatively high percentages of divorces involving children
143
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Client reports, however, are in sharp disagreement with the results
tabulated from the lawyer questionnaires and indicate a relatively low
level of attorney involvement in divorce negotiations. Although the
interviewed clients had a higher proportion of substantial property
and support awards than did the randomly sampled pool,159 they re-
called far less difficulty in reaching agreement unassisted on settle-
ments and far less contact with their attorneys than is suggested by
the profiles derived from the lawyer questionnaires. Thus, whereas
most lawyers reported having to negotiate substantive disputes con-
cerning property in at least 60% of their cases,' 60 only 32%1o1 of the
interviewees indicated that their attorneys had played any appreciable
role in determining property arrangements. Slightly over 40%16" of
the interviewed client group stated that they received assistance from
or significant property negotiations were disproportionately likely to exceed the four-
hour average computed for the sample as a whole.
TABLE I
Lawyer Estimates of Time Spent, on the Average, Negotiating with
Defendant's Attorney in Uncontested Cases
Percentage of Lawyers
Reporting More Than
Lawyer's Description of Four Hours of Negotiations
His Divorce Practice Per Action
0-60% of Divorces Handled Involve
Children (n=30), 23.3%
60-100% of Divorces Handled Involve
Children (n=66)b 45.5%
0-60% of Divorces Handled Require
Negotiations Over Property (n=39), 23.3%
60-100% of Divorces Handled Require
Negotiations Over Property (n_56)d 48.2%
Base is less than 33 due to the exclusion of three questionnaires in which no response
was given.
b Base is less than 73 due to the exclusion of seven questionnaires in which no response
was given.
IBase is less than 41 due to the exclusion of two questionnaires in which no response
was given.
d Base is less than 64 due to the exclusion of eight questionnaires in which no response
was given.
159. See note 62 supra.
160. See note 156 supra. Lawyers reporting relatively high uncontested divorce volumes
tended to give slightly higher negotiation estimates. Id.
161. 31/98 (base less than 99 due to exclusion of one interview in which no response
was given).
162. 42/98 (base less than 99 due to exclusion of one interview in which no response
was given).
144
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their attorneys regarding either property, alimony, child support,
custody, or visitation. However, in a number of instances aid was
reported under circumstances in which no negotiations were con-
ducted.1 3 Omission of this latter group left a total of 29%114 of the
divorces in the interviewed client sample which, according to client
responses, may have involved disputes resolved by attorney negotiation.
Discrepancies are also evident in attorney and client estimates of
contact with each other during the course of a dissolution. For pur-
poses of comparison, phone and personal contact estimates were
divided into two groups, with a respondent's classification depending
upon whether he reported more than three of either type of contact.
This dividing line split the client population into approximately equal
subsets. No effort was made to assign comparative weights to phone
and personal contacts. For both lawyers and clients, requested contact
estimates covered the period between the initial interview and the
final hearing. Table 5 shows the striking contrast between the percep-
tions of lawyers and clients.'0 3
TABLE 5
Lawyer and Client Contact Estimates




4 or More Personal
and/or 4 or More Phone
Contacts Reported 96.0% 53.3%
1 Base is less than 106 due to the exclusion of questionnaires in which no response was
given.
b Base is less than 99 duc to the exclusion of intcrvicws in which no responsc was
given.
163. Clients were asked whether they had reachcd agrecment with their spouse con-
cerning financial or parental matters without consulting an attorney (see Appendix 3,
questions 3-5). Fourteen respondents who answered in the negative volunteered informa-
tion which indicated that their lawyer had not been involved in negotiating the terms
of dissolution. Generally there had been a substantial period of separation, during
which a de facto settlement had evolved; the attorney simply formalized the existing
arrangement.
164. 28/98 (base less than 99 due to exclusion of one interview in which no response
was given).
165. This disparity is statistically significant at the .001 level. The more detailed
analysis of the data presented in Table J reveals that the gap between lawyer and client
perceptions narrows only for those plaintiffs whose interview responses contained some
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Thirty percent 6 6 of the clients (21%167 of those with children) re-
called no personal conferences or only one conference with their
lawyers.
Even if these client reports are regarded as less credible than the
attorney estimates, contributions to the negotiation process cannot be
invoked as justifications for the lawyer monopoly. Given the present
contours of unauthorized practice doctrine, the potential value of
mediation in uncontested actions does not provide a convincing basis
for excluding laymen from all aspects of the divorce process. Divorce
negotiations have never been construed as an exclusive prerogative of
attorneys. In fact, many matrimonial courts rely on lay agencies to
oversee negotiations in dissolution cases.'0 8 While these agencies have
evidence of lawyer involvement in negotiations over finances or children (see p. 145 supra).
TABLE J
Lawyer and Client Contact Estimates: Client Subgroups
Interviewed Interviewed
Clients Whose Clients Whose
Interviewed Decrees Con- Lawyers As-
Respondent Clients With tained Property sisled With
Lawyers Children or Support Negotiations
(n=l00)1 (n=47)b Awards (n=59)c  (n=26)"
0-3 Personal and
0-3 Phone Contacts
Reported 4.0% 40.4% 40.7% 23.1%
4 or More Personal
and/or 4 or More
Phone Contacts
Reported 96.0% 59.6% 59.3 % 76.9%
I Base is less than 106 due to the exclusion of six questionnaires in which no response
was given.
b Base is less than 49 due to the exclusion of two interviews in which no response
was given.
Base is less than 64 due to the exclusion of five interviews in which no response
was given.
d Base is less than 28 due to the exclusion of two interviews in which no response
was given.
Moreover, although 47.5% (47/99) of the lawyers reported four or more personal con-
tacts and seven or more phone conversations, on the average, per uncontested divorce,
only 10.8% (10/92) of the client recollections were in this range. (Bases are less than 106
(for lawyers) and 99 (for clients) due to the exclusion of cases in which no response was
given.)
166. 28/95 (base less than 99 due to exclusion of four interviews in which no response
was given).
167. 10/47 (base less than 49 due to exclusion of two interviews in which no response
was given).
168. Connecticut employs 38 lay domestic relations officers in nine offices attached to
superior court divisions throughout the state. These offices received referrals of 1,764
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historically placed primary emphasis on reconciliation and resolution
of custody/visitation issues, their utility in facilitating property and
support settlements has been widely recognized. 69
Although unauthorized practice doctrine does not restrict the
negotiation function to lawyers, it might yet be maintained that they
are uniquely suited to assume that role.'70 From this assertion could
flow an argument for banning pro se kits and services. If parties can
obtain form preparation assistance only from an attorney, they will
be more likely to rely on his guidance in resolving financial and
parental disputes. It is, however, questionable whether a lawyer's
special training renders him either an essential or effective negotiat-
ing agent in the divorce context.
As has already been noted, no-fault divorce statutes typically do not
afford useful standards of fairness with regard to financial and
parental issues.' 7 ' What is important in uncontested cases is that the
parties arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement which will be satis-
contested matters in fiscal year 1974-75, categorized as follows: custody, 1,016; visitation,
384; finances, 131; vacate orders, 45; other, 188. FIAMILY RELt.TIONs DIvIsIoN, CONNECTICUT
SUI'ERIOR COURT, ANN m. REPORT FISC.L YEAR 1974-1975 at 1, unnumbered p.22 (1975). In
addition, the Division conducted 4,657 "court conferences" with "attorneys and litigants
prior to hearing in an effort to resolve disputed issues through amicable agreement or to
identify and focus the issues actually in dispute." Id. at 5.
Connecticut's lay domestic relations officers are explicitly empowered to "attempt the
reconciliation and adjustment of differences between the parties to dissolution of mar-
riage and legal separation proceedings, particularly where there are minor children
involved." CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 398(e) (1975). 1n New Haven most contested
dissolution matters are automatically referred to the local Domestic Relations Office.
Interview with Bernard Christenson, Director of the New Haven Domestic Relations
Office, in New Haven (Feb. 4, 1976) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
Such referrals are not unique to Connecticut. By 1965 at least 27% of all American
divorce tribunals employed counseling personnel. J. QUENSTEDT & C. WINKLER, WHAT ARE
OUR DotEs lc RELrTIONs JUDGEs THINKING?, unnumbered pA (ABA Family Law Section
Monograph No. 1, July 1965). A 1971 study reported extensive use of lay conciliation
and mediation adjuncts in 14 states. McLaughlin, Court-Connected Marriage Counselling
and Divorce-the New York Experience, 11 J. FA.. L. 517, 517 (1971).
169. Maxine Virtue's 1956 study for the ABA's Interprofessional Commission on
Marriage and Divorce Laws concluded that court marriage counseling services were
useful in "reducing tension and conflict between spouses so that they can co-operate
more efficiently with counsel and with the judge." M. VIRTUE, supra note 6, at 220.
Accord, Foster, Conciliation and Counselling in the Courts in Family Law Cases, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 353, 381 (1966); Baum, A Trial Judg,'s Random Reflections on Divorce: The
Social Problem and What Lawyers Can Do About It, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 451, 457 (1965).
A recent conciliation program in the New York courts "had meager results in reconciling
couples," but "did effective work in the conciliation of disputes as to ancillary matters
such as alimony, child support, custody and visitation." Foster & Freed, supra note 93,
at 473. The report of the Committee on Uniform Marriage and Divorce Legislation
adverted favorably to use of conferences with forensic social workers where "financial
matters were in dispute or had not been settled." R. LEVY, supra note 5 at 116.
170. Cf. Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 46, at 81-92 (discussion of salience of
negotiation activity in legal practice generally).
171. See p. 138 supra.
147
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factory to the court. To that end, their preeminent need is likely to be
a delineation of the perimeters within which choice is possible, e.g.,
minimum and maximum child support figures likely to be acceptable
to the presiding judge. For couples capable of reaching a consensus
once informed of extant judicial norms, published guidelines could
suffice. 172
Moreover, relegating the initial perimeter-setting function to an
attorney can be counterproductive in the divorce context, given his
commitment under Canon 7 to "Represent a Client Zealously Within
the Bounds of the Law."173 This Canon, with its accompanying direc-
tive to "resolve in favor of [the] client doubts as to the bounds of the
law,' 174 invites the parties' attorneys to stake out positions at opposite
poles of the broad spectrum of permissible support and property
allocations.1
73
Where this invitation is accepted, the long-term interests of the
divorcing couple and their children are jeopardized. Unrealistic ex-
pectations may be instilled; parties represented by two advocates whose
initial positions intersect at few or no points face an unnecessarily
divisive bargaining process.'70 Acrimonious interchanges may reduce
the prospects for enduring adherence to the accords reached. So too, a
"victory" for one party in negotiations may produce a skewed accom-
172. Sliding numerical scales, which gear recommended child support awards to payor
income and family size, are proposed in Loucks, Explaining Divorce Proceedings to a
Client, 20 PRAC. LAw., Jan. 1974, at 83, 85; and Lamensdorf, A Guide for Pendente Lite
Support, FAm. L. NEWSLETIER, Spring 1974, at 14, 14. For comments by judges on the
utility of standardized, graduated guidelines for child support, see J. QUENSTEDr 8- C.
WINKLER, supra note 168, at 2. Such guidelines could, of course, be made public. California
Divorce League (lay divorce assistance) offices refer clients to state welfare department
estimates on the cost of child rearing. Telephone Interview with Ruth Ordesch, supra
note 31.
173. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImILITY Canon 7 (1975).
174. Id. EC 7-3. In the same vein, note 10 to Canon 7 refers to ABA Opinion 314
(1965): "'[A] lawyer who is asked to advise his client ... may freely urge the statement
of positions most favorable to his client just as long as there is a reasonable basis for
those positions.'"
175. This temptation is recognized in Baum, supra note 169, at 460, and Freeman &
Weihofen, Client Counseling in Negotiating the Terms of A Divorce, 18 PRuc. LAw.,
April 1972, at 41, 47. See R. FELDER, supra note 6, at 1-2 ("[Olnce I have been hired....
my sole aim is to gain victory. And in doing so, I will do anything and everything I
think necessary to serve the interests of my client ... to gain him a divorce in which he
will come out financially, psychologically-in every way-on top.")
176. Thus, one interviewed client reported that a tentative agreement between the
spouses was rejected by both their lawyers as too favorable to the other side; the out-
come of extended bargaining was a settlement identical to that proposed initially.
The Kahn study drew upon an extensive matrimonial law practice for the following
observation: "When two lawyers are pitted against each other and engaged in legal
combat on behalf of their clients, matrimonial problems obviously are not being solved.
Each lawyer, championing the cause of his client, only magnifies ill will ...... R.
KAHN & L. KAHN, supra note 7, at 73-74.
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modation which is unworkable in the long run.177 Since many provi-
sions in divorce settlements, among them alimony, child support, and
visitation, require cooperation over an extended interval, the adverse
consequences of misplaced advocacy may prove substantial.
The lawyer questionnaires suggest that these dangers are too often
unappreciated. When asked to characterize their most important func-
tions in an uncontested divorce action, a sizeable minority of attorneys
responded with statements comparable to the following:
To get the most money that you can for the wife and to save the
husband as much as possible.
As counsel for the wife your job is to thrust, while a husband's
counsel is basically a defensive maneuver.
Representing wife: getting money from husband. Representing
husband: presenting hardship case.
Twenty-three percent T8 of questionnaire respondents, and 32.7 % 1 7 9
of those handling more than 10 divorces for plaintiffs per year, phrased
their responses specifically in terms of advocacy of their client's posi-
tion, as opposed to an eqitable adjustment between the parties.
An additional impediment to effective mediation by attorneys is
the high percentage of unrepresented defendants in uncontested
divorce cases. Fifty-six percent of the defendants in the lawyer-
initiated cases sampled for the Project did not retain counsel. 8 0
Table 6 reveals that many defendants were without legal representa-
tion even in cases involving children and financial awards.
177. As one lawyer wrote in a response to the Project questionnaire: "Unfair and/or
burdensome arrangements will result in continuing disputes and unhappiness after
judgment." Similar considerations moved Wheeler to conclude that parties might be more
likely to live up to an agreement reached in conference with a disinterested counselor
than they would be if their settlement represented the result of a clash of advocates. M.
WHEELER, supra note 16, at 108.
178. 23/99 (base less than 106 due to exclusion of seven questionnaires in which no
response was given).
179. 17/52 (base less than 55 due to exclusion of three questionnaires in which no
response was given).
180. Attorneys filed appearances on behalf of defendants in 41.8% (138/330) of the
lawyer-initiated actions. (Base is less than 331 due to the exclusion of file for which
a datum was inadvertently omitted.) In seven additional cases, although no appearance
was entered, a separation agreement was filed which stated that the defendant had been
represented in negotiations by a lawyer. The remaining 185 defendants in the sample
(56.1%) were classified as unrepresented, meaning that they had not retained an attorney
at any point in the proceedings.
The accuracy of this method of determining lawyer involvement is confirmed by
interview responses. Based on file data, one-half of the defendants in the interviewed
client cases were placed in the "unrepresented" category. lVhen asked if their spouses had
retained an attorney, 98 of the 99 interviewed clients gave an answer in accord with
the initial classifications.
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TABLE 6
Unrepresented Defendants in Lawyer-Initiated Cases
Category Relative Frequency
All Cases (n-330)2 56.1%
Cases Involving Minor Children (n=160)b 51.3%
Cases Not Involving Minor Children (n=168)' 61.3%
Cases Involving Financial Awards (Property,
Alimony, and/or Child Support) (n=199) 44.2%
Cases Not Involving Financial Awards (n=130)' 73.8%
Inadvertent omission of data required the exclusion of files from certain computations, as
indicated below:
Base is less than 331 due to exclusion of one file.
b Base is less than 162 due to exclusion of two files.
Base is less than 169 due to exclusion of one file.
d Base is less than 200 due to exclusion of one file.
I Base is less than 131 due to exclusion of one file.
These circumstances placed major ethical restraints upon plaintiffs'
attorneys desiring to mediate between the parties. Disciplinary Rule
7-104 and Ethical Consideration 7-18 of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility severely constrict the extent to which attorneys may
deal directly with unrepresented "adversaries": any proffer of advice
in the course of contact with such parties is explicitly proscribed.'"
In conjunction with the Canon that "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even
the Appearance of Professional Impropriety,"'182 these strictures in-
hibit a lawyer's oversight of negotiations between his client and an
unrepresented defendant spouse 83 This problem is widely recognized
in the literature,'5 4 one suggested response being the procurement of
181. Ethical Consideration 7-18 requires that lawyers dealing with unrepresented
parties "not undertake to give advice to tile person ...except [to] advise him to obtain
a lawyer." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-18 (1975). Accord, id. DR
7-104.
182. Id. Canon 9.
183. To assess the impact of the ethical dilemma on lawyers' behavior in the surveyed
counties, the Project's questionnaire asked attorneys for estimates of the amount of time
spent negotiating, on the average, with unrepresented defendants. Only 43A% (46/106)
of the respondents indicated that they engaged in the practice at all; a majority of those
who did typically spent an hour or less. Thus, unless the defendant hired a lawyer,
most attorneys surveyed curtailed their role as negotiators.
EC 7-18 was discussed at the ABA's 1976 Annual Meeting, where a panelist in a
symposium on family law practice indicated that he always refuses to talk with un-
represented defendants. 45 U.S.LAV. 2113 (Aug. 24, 1976).
184. See, e.g., Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 46, at 89; R. KAHN & L. KAHN,
supra note 7, at 129; Baum, supra note 169, at 460; Merder, The Need for an Expanded
Role for the Attorney in Divorce Counseling, 4 F.,\.. L.Q. 280, 291 (1970); Philips, Mental
Hygiene, Divorce, and the Law, 3 J. FAN.f. L. 63, 65 (1963). Phyllis Eliasberg, a California
lawyer who heads the Wave Project, a divorce counseling organization, advocates banning
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a defendant's signed acknowledgment that "you are his wife's at-
torney and are obliged to protect her interests, and you owe no duty
to him."a s5 Negotiations can then proceed, but they do so under condi-
tions which are unlikely to enhance the probability of consensus or to
promote adequate dissemination of information to both parties.
To be sure, there are cases which, although legally uncontested,
nevertheless involve disputes so heated that both sides benefit by
hiring lawyers to assert their interests. However, less than one-third
of the actions involving the Project's interviewed clients could possibly
be so characterized.'8 0 A relatively infrequent eventuality cannot sup-
port the use of unauthorized practice doctrine to force all divorce
plaintiffs to employ attorneys.
Thus, the primary constituents of an uncontested divorce practice
attorneys entirely from divorce proceedings because she believes their adversary role
militates against conciliation between the two parties. Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 1976, at 1,
col. 1.
185. Freeman & Weihofen, supra note 175, at 42. See 45 U.S.L.W. 2113 (Aug. 24, 1976)
(symposium panelist at 1976 ABA Annual Meeting reports using similar warning when
dealing with unrepresented defendants: "I have no obligation to look after your interests
and I have no obligation to be fair to you.") It should be noted that the unrepresented
defendant is not always male: 63% of the 103 defendant women in the lawyer-initiated
sample did not retain attorneys.
186. Table K compares the minority of interviewed clients (29%) who received some
negotiation assistance with the rest of the interviewed sample. Attorney negotiations
usually occurred in cases involving ancillary property and child-related matters. While
these actions presented opportunities for legal contributions, it must be noted that
lawyer aid was frequently expensive and brought little satisfaction to the recipients.
TABLE K





Joint In- tion with
come in Fee in Lawyer's
Excess of House Children Excess of Handling
$515,000/yr. Involved Involved $950 of Divorce* "
Involvement Reported 46.4% 78.6% 71A% 47.8% 64.3%(n=28) (n=23)'
No Invohement Reported 34.8% 48.6% 41.4% 9.3% 24.3%
(n=70) (n=69)b (n=54)b
* With the exception of income, all the contrasts revealed in Table K are statistically
significant at the .01 level. The income differential is not significant at the .05 level.
" Clients were not asked directly whether they were satisfied with their lawyer's
performance. This categorization is based on responses to questions regarding, inter alia,
fees, negotiations, and the general manner in which the client's case was handled.
Base is less than 28 due to the exclusion of interviews in which no response was given.
b Base is less than 70 due to the exclusion of interviews in which no response was given.
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appear to be elementary formalities, ancillary advisory functions ir-
regularly exercised, and episodic mediation problems that can be
exacerbated by legal representation. To these characteristics must be
added a final, human dimension.
In defining their most important divorce functions, attorneys who
completed the Project questionnaire placed emotional support and
personal counseling second in priority only to the negotiation of
disputes. 8 7 Almost one-half of the lawyers adverted to matters sub-
sumed by one respondent under the following expansive labels:
"Acting as psychologist, father-figure, confidant, and psychiatrist. ' 18
Arguably, these characterizations suggest reasons to reconsider rather
than retain the lawyer monopoly over form processing in divorce ac-
tions. For, as numerous commentators have observed, legal training
does not provide adequate preparation for personal counseling. 18
Divorcing parties may experience psychological and emotional dis-
locations'90 which will not readily dissipate upon application of the
amateurish advice with which the family law literature is replete.'
187. See Table 4, p. 141 supra.
188. For similar characterizations of the divorce lawyer's role, see R. FELDER, supra
note 6, at 62-63; H. O'GoRMAN, supra note 11, at 107; and Spellman, How Should the
Adequacy of Compensation for the Wile's Attorney in Divorce Cases Be Detcrnined?, 4
FAM. L.Q. 53, 56 (1970).
189. See Alexander, Public Service by Lawyers in the Field of Divorce, 13 011o ST.
L.J. 13, 19 (1952); Baum, supra note 169, at 464-65; Bellinson, Changing Dynamics in
Attorney-Client Relationship Due to No-Fault Divorce Legislation, FA.M. L. NEWSLETTER,
June, 1973, at 5, 6-7. One commentator has urged that all counseling functions be per-
formed by qualified laymen, in a move to "free the lawyer from his present role as an
amateur family therapist and allow him to devote himself to the legal aspects of family
dissolution." Kay, A Family Court: The California Proposal, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 1205, 1211
(1968).
Those few lawyers who possess degrees in psychology or counseling are prohibited by
ABA regulations from stating the fact on their professional cards. See ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-102(E) (1970); ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND GRIEVANCS,
INFORMAL OPINION No. 1248 (1972). Cf. id. No. 1049 (1968) (practicing lawyer may not be
listed in classified section of the telephone directory under "Marriage and Family
Counselors" if also listed under "Lawyers").
190. W. GOODE, supra note 59, at 186-87; M. HUNT, THE WORLD OF THE FORMERLY
MARRIED 27-31 (1966); N. KOHUT, supra note 59, at 50-51; H. O'GORMAN, supra note 11, at
82-92.
191. For example, a 1963 seminar for divorce lawyers produced the assertion by one
panelist that women who complain about their spouse's brutality or alcoholism "[g]en-
erally . . . want only the lawyer's sympathy and never complete the [divorce] proceed-
ings." Barnett, Emotional Problems Encountered in Divorce Cases-A Seminar, 3 J. FAM.
L. 208, 211 (1963). Seminar participants were further advised to handle "obstinate" clients
who "argue" and "won't follow advice" by threatening to withdraw from the case, since
"most women clients will accede under this threat." Id. at 218.
Another writer urges lawyers to handle demands posed by emotionally disturbed
clients by announcing that all phone calls will be individually billed at substantial
rates: "[sluch handling can have a good therapeutic effect on the client." Usdin, Marital
Problems and the Attorney, 12 Loy. L. REv. 9, 12 (1965). Divorce lawyers have been
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However, the present lawyer monopoly over form processing renders
attorneys the first and often the only source of aid with such prob-
lems.19'
2
Of special concern in this context are certain findings of the Project
regarding interviewed clients whose divorces may have involved sig-
nificant spousal conflict. 93 Sixty-five percent' 94 of these plaintiffs
received no counseling from sources other than a lawyer throughout
the pendency of their divorce proceedings. 9 5 Yet 57.7% 190 were con-
cluding a marriage of more than 10-years duration, 71.4% had minor
children, 82.1% were female, and 82.1% had undergone less than six
months of separation from their spouses at the time of filing (57.1%
had not yet separated). However well-intentioned, the attorneys serv-
ing these clients were clearly not an optimal source of therapy. Re-
moving the necessity of hiring a lawyer to prepare divorce papers
might perform the salutary function of diverting more couples to
qualified counselors, 197 while leaving those desiring attorney guidance
free to obtain it.
IV. The Costs of the Lawyer Monopoly
The most obvious cost of the lawyer's divorce processing monopoly
is the financial burden imposed on those who must purchase legal
services. As Table 7 demonstrates, 88.4% of the clients interviewed
paid at least $500 for their divorces; 38.4% were charged more than
$750. Nine pro se plaintiffs volunteered that they had been quoted
advised to generate sex counseling insights from "self-perception," id. at 10, and to rely
on their "intuitive understanding of human nature" when confronted with psychological
instability, Merder, supra note 184, at 288.
192. Divorce lawyers seldom refer clients to lay counseling professionals. N. KOHUT,
supra note 59, at 95-96 (citing sources). Only one of the Project's 106 completed attorney
questionnaires mentioned such referrals as one of the lawyer's most important functions.
Cf. Merder, supra note 184, at 294 (discussing laws in Canada, England, and Australia
that require attorneys to provide all divorce clients with list of marriage counselors).
193. The 28 clients so classified were the 29% who indicated that they had received
attorney assistance in negotiating the terms of parental and/or financial settlements. See
p. 145 supra.
191. 17/26 (base less than 28 due to exclusion of two interviews in which no response
was given).
195. As to the rest of the interviewed clients, the percentage receiving no counseling,
69% (47/68), was only slightly greater. (Base is less than 70 due to the exclusion of two
interviews in which no response was given.)
196. 15/26 (base less than 28 due to exclusion of two interviews in which no response
was given).
197. If parties need not employ a lawyer to initiate divorce proceedings, they may be
less inclined to seek attorney advice on personal problems. Presumably, too, the avail-
ability of inexpensive form preparation assistance would release resources with which
couples could secure professional counseling services.
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TABLE 7
Reports by Interviewed Clients of Fee Charged
by Their Attorneys (n=78)'
Fee Range Relative Frequency




$1000 or more 20.5%
Base is less than 99 due to the exclusion of cases in which no response was given.
This question elicited by far the lowest response rate of any on the interview form. It
does not appear likely that low fees were disproportionately concealed, however, since the
response rate was higher for parties whose divorces involved no support or property
awards (79.4%) than for clients who underwent more complex divorces (76.9%).
prices averaging $750 for divorces they ultimately obtained them-
selves with the aid of the four-dollar Pro Se Dissolution Kit.
198
Even those clients whose dissolutions were unencumbered by prop-
erty or child support award5 paid $500 or more in 77.8%190 of the
cases. In none of these cases did the clients report lawyer invcgement
in any divorce negotiations, and for the most part they had little con-
tact with their attorneys.200 In effect, they were paying substantial
sums for representation at a hearing and three completed forms: a
complaint, claim for a hearing, and decree.201 Lawyers responding to
the Project questionnaire reported needing a little under one hour,
on the average, to prepare these forms. Most of these attorneys in-
dicated that they spent an additional hour or less on the initial client
interview, plus approximately an hour and a half waiting in court for
198. In addition to the kit price, pro se plaintiffs (and their lawyer-assisted counter-
parts) were required to pay a $45 filing fee, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-259 (1975), and the
sheriff's charge for serving the complaint, id. § 52-261; p. 125 supra. Indigents can
apply for a waiver of these fees. See note 213 infra.
199. 21/27 (base less than 34 due to exclusion of seven interviews in which no response
was given).
200. Fourteen of the 34 interviewed plaintiffs whose divorces did not involve financial
awards stated that they saw their lawyers in person once or not at all between the initial
interview and the final hearing. Only four of these plaintiffs reported more than three
personal conferences.
201. One plaintiff, separated from her husband for two years and no longer sure of
his whereabouts, was charged $900 (and felt it was a fair fee because "I work for a
lawyer who charges more"); a woman whose six-year separation had been preceded by
only three months of cohabitation was billed $850; and an elderly couple whose ante-
nuptial agreement settled all property matters .paid 5900. Another couple with joint fees
totaling $1,750 was told by their lawyers that additional charges would be imposed if a
formal property settlement were drawn up; they dispensed with one.
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the case to be called. As timed by the authors, hearings involving no
support orders or property divisions rarely consumed more than three
minutes.2
02
Where lawyers were called upon to do more, their fees escalated
accordingly. Sixty-eight percent 20 3 of those plaintiffs whose divorces
involved support orders or property awards paid more than $600. More
than one-quarter 20 4 of the plaintiffs' fees exceeded $1000. The cost of
the defendant's attorney, where present, is not included. Such figures
are not unique to the two Connecticut counties studied °.2 0
Attorney-client friction over fees was common. Sixty percent of the
interviewed plaintiffs felt that they had been overcharged for the
services rendered. Several reported threats by the lawyer to delay the
proceedings unless paid at once in full.206 There was repeated con-
fusion over whether retainers tendered initially were or were not in-
tended as payment in full.
20 7
These most obvious costs of the monopoly go far to explain the rise
of divorce kit entrepreneurialism and patronage. Eighty-seven percent
of the pro se plaintiffs interviewed were drawn to the kit primarily
because of the financial savings involved.2 0 8 But there are other costs
as well.
202. See p. 129 supra.
203. 34/50 (base less than 65 due to exclusion of 15 interviews in which no response
was given).
204. 14/50 (base less than 65 due to exclusion of 15 interviews in which no response
was given).
205. In New York City the range of fees for uncontested divorces is $600-$1000. Brief
of the Legal Aid Society of New York City as Amicus Curiae at 20, In re Smiley, 36
N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975). The founder of the California Divorce
League reports S500-S750 as the prevailing range in California. Telephone Interview with
Ruth Ordesch, supra note 31. For a discussion of the fee structure in Oregon, see Pagel,
supra note 78, at 344-45. See also note 116 supra.
206. One lawyer reportedly enhanced his leverage by noting that "we get paid whether
you get divorced or not." Another plaintiff's attorney refused to conduct her court
hearing until she paid the last S200 of a $1000 fee.
Fee disputes may explain some of the delays in the scheduling of hearings which
occurred in many lawyer-initiated cases. Normally, the computer-selected hearing date is
two to three weeks after the filing of the claim for trial. All 31 pro se divorces were
heard on the date initially allotted, within 30 days of the claim for trial. However, the
hearing dates of 31.7% (99/312) of the lawyer-initiated cases had to be set back at least
once, with 14.7% (46/312) heard only after two months or more had elapsed following
the claim for trial. (Base is less than 331 because data on dates divorces were claimed
for a hearing were not collected from first 19 files surveyed).
207. In one instance, a plaintiff told to supplement an initial S500 retainer with an
unanticipated S700 increment was forced to sacrifice savings which had been accumulated
toward tuition at a paralegal training center. Five other clients volunteered that initial
fee estimates had been unexpectedly increased by S100-5300 prior to the hearing.
208. Six of the 47 interviewed pro se plaintiffs were primarily motivated by self-
actualizing or feminist considerations in their decision not to hire a lawyer. Such non-
pecuniary inducements, while not controlling for the remainder of the group, were
mentioned by 44.7% of respondents.
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As Table 8 demonstrates, attorneys surveyed for the Project reported
substantial amounts of time spent on formalities readily delegable to
lay specialists or to pro se plaintiffs themselves.2 0 9 Given the rudi-
mentary nature of the activities listed,2 10 the Table 8 data documents
a patently inefficient allocation of professional training. Moreover, by
restricting such tasks to attorneys, unauthorized practice doctrine con-
tributes to the stereotype of divorce lawyers as overcompensated clerks,
a characterization volunteered by many interviewed clients..
2 1 1
TABLE 8
Lawyer Estimates of Average Amount of Time Spent per Uncontested
Divorce Preparing Forms and Waiting in Court for Case to be Heard
Functions
Procuring Waiting in
Preparing the Service by Court for Case Preparing
Complaint Registered To Be Heard the Decree
Average Time Expended (n=101)2 Mail (n=94)2 (n=98)a (n=10l) a
20 min. or less 49.5% 52.1% - 26.7%
21-30 min. 35.6% 14.9% 1.0% 37.6%
31-60 min. 14.9% 16.0% 29.6% 27.7%
More than 60 min. - 17.0% 69.4% 7.9%
,Base is less than 106 due to the exclusion of questionnaires in which no response was
given.
The heaviest monopoly costs, however, are visited upon the in-
digent. In New Haven and Bridgeport, legal aid offices can handle only
a fraction of the requests for their dissolution services, and are com-
pelled to limit caseloads severely.2 12 That private attorneys have failed
209. To ensure that lawyer estimates would not include time spent by secretaries or
paraprofessionals, the questionnaire contained separate requests for average employee
time allocated to each function.
210. The mechanics of form preparation in uncontested actions are described at pp.
124-28 supra. The lengthy intervals spent waiting in court represent particularly wasteful
expenditures of attorney time, given the perfunctory character of the actual hearings.
See p. 129 supra.
211. The low prestige of the matrimonial bar is a recurrent concern in the family
law literature. See, e.g., Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HopsON, supra note 46, at 564; Foley, The
Lawyer's Role in Domestic Relations Cases, 36 OKLA. B.J. 2377, 2377 (1965); Baum, supra
note 169, at 464.
212. The New Haven practice is to take calls for three to four days, during which
time enough divorces are booked to occupy the office for three months. No new divorce
clients are accepted until the three month period ends, when the floodgates once again
open briefly. Interview with Mary Keller, supra note 96. In Bridgeport a waiting list was
initially tried and then discarded in favor of the New Haven approach; at one point the
list contained 800 names. Interview with David Snyder, supra note 53.
The problem does not exist only in Connecticut. In New York City, for instance, the
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to meet the excess demand is suggested by the fact that only 21 of the
331 plaintiffs in the lawyer-initiated files (6.3%) were recipients of
state welfare assistance.2 13 Absent a constitutionally guaranteed right
to counsel in divorce proceedings 21 4 or institutional reform,215 low-
cost lay help in initiating a dissolution is the only practical alternative
to consigning the poor of these counties to the extrajudicial remedies
endured by their predecessors.2106
The arguments against lay assistance appear especially suspect when
applied to divorces involving indigents. Ancillary issues often invoked
Bronx and Brooklyn legal aid offices can accommodate less than one-half of the applicants
for their dissolution services. Brief of the Legal Aid Society of New York City as Amicus
Curiae at 17-18, In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975).
Further, as of 1974, 28 of the 62 counties in New York State had no legal assistance
offices. Brief of the Monroe County Legal Assistance Corporation as Amicus Curiae at 9,
In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975). In1 1970, 172,688 persons
(11% of the total population) in these 28 counties were officially classified as indigent. Id.
For the nation as a whole, there were only 300 staffed legal assistance programs draw-
ing federal funds in 1972. S. BRAKEL, JUOieARE: PUBLIC FuNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS, AND POOR
PEOPLE 6 (1974). Congressional allocations for legal services programs totalled S100 million
for fiscal year 1976. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2996i(a) (Supp.
IV 1974). This constitutes less than four dollars for each of the 25.8 million Americans at
or below the poverty level. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 4, and 36, col. 3.
213. Moreover, in only three of these 21 cases was a waiver of court fees applied for.
These fees, usually totaling about 370, are described in note 198 supra. The waiver be-
came an entitlement of all indigent divorce plaintiffs after Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971). Ninety-three percent (93/100) of the private attorneys who responded to
the Project questionnaire indicated that they had never applied for a Boddie waiver on
behalf of an uncontested divorce plaintiff. (Base is less than 106 due to the exclusion of
six questionnaires in which no response was given.)
214. For a recent case refusing to recognize such a right despite extensive evidence of
the inability of existing sources of free legal services to accommodate more than a
fraction of indigents seeking divorces, see In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369
N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975).
215. See pp. 165-66 infra.
216. Fees charged by private attorneys for uncontested dissolutions have long been
well beyond the reach of the poor. See ten Broek, California's Dual System of Family Law:
Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, Part III, 17 STAN. L. REV. 614, 617 (1965);
Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 381, 397
(1965). And legal assistance programs historically have been neither equipped nor in-
cdined to service the needs of the nation's low income population for divorce adjudica-
tions. A 1967 compilation by the National Legal Aid & Defender Association revealed
only 298 civil legal aid offices with paid staff, 90 volunteer offices, and 98 volunteer
committees in the entire United States. As of 1972, the total number of paid staff offices
was 300. See note 212 supra. Of the 3100 counties in the United States, 2500 (containing
one-third of the national population) had no legal aid facilities whatsoever. Silverstein,
Eligibility for Free Legal Services in Civil Cases, 44 J. URB. L. 549, 555 (1967). Data on
130 offices revealed that in 1966 only 26 had "open" policies concerning divorce: 23
excluded such cases entirely, and 81 had restrictive policies (cases accepted only under
circumstances such as physical mistreatment of wife or children, spouse jailed or in
mental asylum, or request by a social services agency). Id. at 574-80. For more recent
statistics on the continued inability of legal services offices to meet the needs of the
poor in dissolution actions, see note 212 supra.
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to justify the lawyer monopoly are of little relevance to the poor. -2 17
Predictably, only one of the 46 legal aid divorces sampled for the
Project involved a house, and only one produced a formal allocation
of property. Less than one-quarter of the defendants in these cases
were represented by attorneys; an equal number of defendants not
only did not have lawyers but had moved to parts unknown, eliminat-
ing any prospect of negotiation. In Table 9, these figures are com-
pared with those obtaining for the lawyer-initiated sample.
To supplement the file data summarized above, the Project's lawyer
questionnaire was mailed to five Bridgeport and New Haven legal aid
attorneys, four of whom responded. 218 The two who reported the
largest volume of divorces spent an average of only 15-30 minutes per
uncontested case in negotiations with unrepresented defendants, with
the figure rising slightly to one hour for actions in which the de-
fendant had secured an attorney.
Although no attempts have been made to quantify the number of low-income in-
dividuals who have been deterred from seeking a divorce because of cost, the striking
class differential in the incidence of nonlegal separations is suggestive.
TABLE L
Households with Divorced or Separated Head, by Income Category
A bove Poverty Below Poverty
Line Line
Head Divorced 1,134,000 (68.0%) 402,000 (44.6%)
Head Separated 534,000 (32.0%) 500,000 (55.4%)
*Adapted from DUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF PO1'rJtTION, SuBJEcT REPORTS
PC(2)-9A: Low INCOME POPULITIN 137 (1974) (Table 12).
The extent to which de facto separation functions as a permanent surrogate for legal
dissolution is discussed in ten Broek, supra, at 617 n.749; and Kay & Philips, supra note
107, at 727. The possibility that members of lower socioeconomic groups generally prefer
informal separation to divorce seems tenuous, in view of the high volume of client
demand at legal assistance offices which handle such cases. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 2,
1966, at 16, col. 3 (in first six weeks of Wisconsin Judicare program, 84% of incoming
requests were for divorce); note 212 supra. Cf. Foster, Common Law Divorce, 46 MNN.
L. REv. 43 (1961) (enumerating sociological factors contributing to desertion, yet con-
cluding at 67: "Unless divorce is relatively inexpensive, desertion and self-divorce are
bound to occur.")
Those unable to afford a divorce but unwilling to tolerate the uncertainties of de
facto separation have resorted to other extralegal remedies, including patently invalid
mail order decrees. See Rosenberg, How Void is a Void Decree, or The Estoppel Effect
of Invalid Divorce Decrees, 8 FAm. L.Q. 207, 214-15 (1974); Foster, supra at 60-61.
217. See generally Goldberger, Legal Aid Divorces: A Practical Approach, 20 Am. U.
L. REv. 30 (1975).
218. These five attorneys handled all 46 legal aid divorces sampled for the Project.
The questionnaires which they completed were excluded from the tabulations of private
lawyer responses presented elsewhere in the Project.
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Percentages of Legal Aid and Lawyer-Initiated Divorces
Involving Ancillary Legal Issues
Relative Jrequency
Lawyer-Initiated Legal Aid Cases
Category Cases (n=331) (n=46)
operty Award 23.9% 2.2%
Awards Mentioning 18.0% 0
Houses (n=328)'
Awards Mentioning 7.3% 0
Automobiles (n=328)'
Awards Mentioning Both 4.6% 0
Houses and Automobiles (n=328)'
imony Award 42.3% 47.8%
Lump Sum Alimony 9.1% 0
1. $I-5000 6.9% 0
2. $5000+ 2.1% 0
Periodic Alimony 34.1% 47.8%
1. $1/yr 13.4% 22.2%
(n=329)' (n=45)b
2. $5-50/wk 15.8% 24.4%
(n=329)" (n=45)b
3. $5 1 +/wk 4.6% 0
(n=329)* (n=45)b
paration Agreement Filed 26.9% 8.7%
ome Ownership Listed in File 35.3% 2.2%
efendants Represented by an 43.9% 23.9%
torney (n=330)'
fendant's Whereabouts 4.8% 26.1%
Unknown
Child Support Award in Cases 88.2% 75.0%d
Involving Minor Children (n=161)*
a. $25/wk or less 24.4% 33.3%
(n=156)'
b. $26-50/wk 34.0% 30.6%
(n=156)*
c. $51+/wk 29.5% 11.1%
(n=156)*
Base is less than 331 due to the exclusion of files for which data were inadvertently
omitted.
b Base is less than 46 due to the exclusion of files for which data were inadvertently
omitted.
Base is less than 162 due to the exclusion of files for which data were inadvertently
omitted.
d Thirty-six of the legal aid cases involved minor children.
The Yale Law Journal
With regard to spousal and child support in cases involving in-
digents, it should be noted that a lawyer from the state attorney
general's office participates in the determination of awards for Con-
necticut plaintiffs on welfare.2 19 With the state thus intervening to
assert the plaintiff's support interests, his attorney's contribution here
is largely redundant.
V. Directions for Reform: The Limited Utility of Published Kits
From December 1974 through May 1976, a total of 63 pro se dis-
solutions were concluded in New Haven Superior Court.220 During
that same interval, the court processed a total of approximately 2,500
uncontested divorces.2 2 1 The lawyer monopoly has scarcely been
challenged.
The low level of kit utilization is to some extent attributable to
local bar association warnings not to advertise. -22 2 Also significant is a
caveat in the Pro Se Dissolution Kit defining the "ideal" pro se couple
as one without children, financial interdependence, or unresolved
questions concerning property.22 3 Yet even if this warning were
universally heeded, it appears that there would still be a substantial
number of potential pro se plaintiffs. Of the Project's 331 lawyer-
initiated actions, 112 (33.8%) involved neither children nor any award
of property or alimony. Thus, perhaps the most important limiting
factor is the threshold level of education, self-confidence, and clerical
219. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-63(a) (1975). Fifty-nine percent (27/46) of the plaintiffs in
the sampled legal aid cases were recipients of state welfare assistance.
220. Thirty-one pro se divorces were heard in New Haven during the period under
study for the Project (December 1974 through October 1975), with 32 following in the
seven subsequent months. No pro se divorces were filed in Bridgeport during this 18-
month interval.
221. This total was obtained by extrapolating from the 1,943 uncontested actions
heard between April 1, 1975 and May 31, 1976.
222. Telephone Interview with Karen Wynn, Pro Se Dissolution Group member (Dec
4, 1975). These threats appear to have tenuous legal grounding at best. It seems clear
from the Connecticut Supreme Court decision in Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 154 Conn.
129, 222 A.2d 339 (1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 683 (1967) (lay estate-planning advice)
that Connecticut unauthorized practice doctrine would permit the publication of a divorce
kit. The Dacey rationale, emphasizing "personalized" information directed to the
particular needs of an individual as the crux of unauthorized practice, has been adopted
in New York and Oregon decisions refusing to bar publication. See pp. 112-13 supra.
It follows that, as the Oregon Court of Appeals declared: "[I]f the defendants may sell
the divorce kits, we think they can advertise the purpose for which they have been
prepared and offered for sale." Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913, 917 (Or. App.
1975).
223. PRO SE DissOLUTION GROUP, supra note 68, at 2.
160
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competence presumed by this or any other carefully prepared do-it-
yourself publication.
2 2 4
As might be anticipated in view of the foregoing discussion, the
demographic profiles of Connecticut pro se plaintiffs contrast sharply
with those of clients in the Project's lawyer-initiated pool. Seventy-six
percent of the interviewed pro se plaintiffs had at least some college
background; 91.5% were under 35; 64.9% had been separated from
their spouses for over six months when they filed complaints. 225 The
atypicality of these kit users is further highlighted by the fact that
224. Initially, the prospective Connecticut kit user must assimilate 15 terse single-
spaced pages which detail every aspect of form preparation. Id. at 1-15. There follows a
three-page glossary of technical terms. Users are cautioned to "follow the given legal
format" and to make no typographical errors. Id. at 11. Finally, there is a checklist of
68 items detailing literally every move required in the progression from complaint to
hearing. Id. at 18-20a.
225. TABLE M
Comparison of Pro Se Plaintiffs and Interviewed Clients: Education, Age,
and Length of Separations
Interviewed Pro Interviewed
Se Plaintiffs (n=47) Clients (n=99)
A. EDUCATION
Less than Four Years of
High School 2.2% 5.1%
b
High School Graduate 21.7%- 43.9%
b
Some College 76.1%- 51.0% b
B. AGE




35 or more ** 8.5% 51.0%
b
C. LENGTH OF SEPARATION BEFORE COMPLAINT FILED
None 39.4%
1-6 Months 35.1%- 24.2%
6-24 Months 48.6%- 27.3%
More than 24 Months 16.2%c 9.1%
* The education, age, and separation contrasts between interviewed pro se plaintiffs
and interviewed clients are statistically significant at the .02, .001, and .001 levels
respectively. These categories of data were not available for plaintiffs in the lawyer-
initiated sample who were not interviewed.
• Only one of the interviewed pro se plaintiffs was over 45, compared with 22
(22A%) of the interviewed clients.
aBase is 46 due to the exclusion of one interview in which no response was given.
was given.
bBase is 98 due to the exclusion of one interview in which no response was given.
was given.
c Base is 37 because the first 10 pro se plaintiffs interviewed were not questioned about
theiX separations.
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their marriages were without exception childless and, in all but four
cases, of less than 10-years duration.220
Forty-nine of the 96 kit purchasers interviewed had decided not to
attempt kit use, at least for the present.227 Usually the delay was a
product of factors unrelated to the kit (e.g., ambivalence concerning
the divorce itself,22s need to comply with residence requirements), but
in 15 cases (30.6%) the primary impediment was a lack of confidence
in capacity to negotiate the process unaided..2 29 A number of purchasers
were intimidated by the kit's exhaustive step-by-step explanations and
warnings about possible hostility toward pro se plaintiffs on the part
of clerks and judges. Others cited a lack of time,2 30 typing skills, or a
typewriter as factors militating against use. Several respondents chafed
226. TABLE N
Comparison of Pro Se and Lawyer-Initiated Actions: Presence of
Minor Children and Duration of Marriage*
Interviewed Pro Se Lawyer-Initiated
Plaintiffs (n=47) Actions (n=331)
A. MINOR CHILDREN
No Minor Children 100% 51.3%.
Minor Children Involved - 48.7%-
B. DURATION OF MARRIAGE
Under 3 Years 34.0% 22.8%
b
3-9.9 Years 57A% 42.3%b
10-19.9 Years 8.5% 19.1% b
20 or More Years - 15.7%b
* The contrasts revealed in Table N are statistically significant at the .001 and .01
levels respectively.
IBase is 330 due to the exclusion of one file for which data were inadvertently omitted.
b Base is 324 due to the exclusion of seven files for which data were inadvertently
omitted.
227. TABLE 0
Reasons Given by Kit Purchasers For Not Ciaving Proceeded with a
Pro Se Divorce Action (n=49)
Plan To Use Kit at Some Future Date 24.5%
Unsure about Divorce 26.5%
Lack Confidence in Capacity To Proceed without Assistance 30.6%
Uncooperative Spouse/Unresolved Issues 12.2%
Other 6.1%
228. This was the case for 13 respondents. One such woman was relieved at the
flexibility the kit gave her in arriving at a decision. She had been coucerned that pay-
ment of a retainer to a lawyer would have had the effect of locking her into the dis-
solution process.
229. In two especially poignant instances, deterred purchasers with neither a high
school education nor funds to hire a lawyer were seeking divorces after 31 and 24 year
separations from their respective spouses.
230. The possibility of repeated trips to the courthouse as a result of errors and/or
harassment by clerks discouraged kit purchasers with inflexible work schedules.
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at the kit's failure to provide information for couples with offspring.2 3 1
The Project's data do not permit firm conclusions about the
potential universe of unassisted kit users,2 3 2 but reports from West
Coast distributors tend to corroborate the limitations suggested by
the New Haven experience. A moderate-volume Oregon center for kit
sales and form processing advice found that only half of its customers
were able to conduct their actions without aid from staff members.
233
Similarly, the founder of California's consortium of pro se divorce
enterprises stated in an interview with the authors that form prep-
aration assistance was essential for "most" clients, especially those of
limited education..
2 34
It is clear that the emergence of a divorce kit in Connecticut has
brought no measurable relief to the area's indigent population. Only
20.5 %233 of interviewed users reported joint incomes below $5,000 per
year, and several of these were students on the verge of substantially
increased earnings. Moreover, none of the plaintiffs who engineered
New Haven's 31 completed pro se divorces were recorded in the court
files as being recipients of state welfare assistance. Financial savings
made possible by the kit have accrued only to a small minority of
relatively young and well-educated couples.
Given the difficulties inherent in unassisted kit use, those jurisdic-
tions that permit kit publication but not personalized lay assistance
to users are, in effect, precluding pro se representation by a substantial
number of divorce plaintiffs. Where only a kit is available, individuals
who lack the requisite assimilative capacities, typing skills, or self-
confidence will be deterred from proceeding pro se. Such capabilities
are uncharacteristic of the low-income population. Yet, as was previ-
ously suggested, indigents are also the group least able to employ a
231. One woman submitted that her offspring would be the "real losers" if she had
to pay the 5800 quoted to her by an attorney. All necessary financial arrangements had
been settled.
232. The pro se divorces studied were limited not only in number, see p. 122
supra, but in complexity as well, perhaps in part because the Connecticut kit expressly
declines to give instructions tailored to parties with children. Files for the 31 New
Haven pro se divorces indicate that only one involved children or financial awards. The
plaintiff in the aberrant case was a man with four children; 'the divorce decree in-
corporated a support agreement signed by the husband and wife. Unfortunately no
telephone listing was available for either spouse, and hence no interview was possible.
None of the pro se divorce actions surveyed produced a formal award of real or personal
property.
233. See Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913, 917 (Or. App. 1975). The center
handled roughly 600 clients a year. Id.
234. Telephone Interview with Ruth Ordesch, supra note 31.
235. 9/44 (base less than 46 due to exclusion of two interviews in which no response
was given).
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lawyer and least likely to have divorces involving the ancillary financial




With his customary prescience, Karl Llewellyn concluded in 1933
that financial impediments to uncontested divorce were unsupport-
able:
[F]rom the standpoint of the litigants and of society, in all cases
of actual mutual acquiescence the costs are unnecessary. As a de-
vice to make divorce difficult they are not only unnecessary (be-
cause time-periods can do the work more effectually than the
present money-costs do), but they are undesirable (because dis-
tribution of divorce-facilities by income is a social outrage). Social-
ly, the costs are ... pure wastes. 237
The demise of the fault system has deflated but by no means re-
moved the costs of divorce in cases of mutual acquiescence. The
procedural vestiges of an adversary system which remain, coupled
with an expansive doctrine of unauthorized practice of law, have
forced most divorce plaintiffs to assume the considerable expense of
employing a lawyer. Yet the procedural prerequisites of a dissolution
action are, in large part, anomalous and dysfunctional.
Insofar as procedural complexity performs t salutary function by
deterring hasty, ill-conceived divorces, that purpose could better be
served by temporal rather than fiscal impediments. The present struc-
ture checks only those individuals who cannot afford a lawyer and
who lack the competence and confidence to navigate the system without
assistance.
238
If, however, procedural complexity is defended as a means of
requiring parties to employ legal intermediaries, then convincing
reasons for preserving that requirement must be demonstrated. The
empirical data assembled for this Project suggest the difficulty of
making such a showing. Neither the arguments traditionally used to
buttress unauthorized practice prohibitions nor the frequent references
by surveyed practitioners to negotiation and counseling contributions
236. See pp. 158-59 supra.
237. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: II, 33 COLUm. L. REV. 249, 286 (1933).
238. To the extent that these personal attributes are inversely correlated with income,
the system operates in a particularly objectionable fashion. At present, many of those
least likely to be able to proceed pro se without individualized assistance are those least
able to afford a private attorney. See In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 448 n.2, 330 N.E.2d 53,
62 n.2, 396 N.Y.S.2d 87, 100 n.2 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); p. 163 supra.
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provide an adequate rationale. When the costs of excluding lay com-
petition are added to the calculus, the case for reform becomes com-
pelling.
The conclusion is inescapable that the formalities requisite to
divorce need not be the exclusive domain of lawyers. From this flow
two corollaries. The first is that the public should not be denied ac-
cess to lay divorce assistance.2 39 Laymen can safely be .permitted to
offer personalized form preparation aid and to publish kits. If abuses
develop, the states retain the option to impose civil liability or in-
stitute licensing requirements.24 0
A second, more elemental proposition is that there are major social
costs involved in imposing the Procrustean frame of an adversarial
system upon nondisputants. It generates needless expense for the
parties241 and a less than optimal allocation of the expertise of lawyers
and judges.2 42 For divorces that involve no substantive contest, an ad-
ministrative rather than an adversarial model is apposite.
239. It should be noted that statutes which permit dissemination of lay assistance
will be vulnerable to judicial nullification in states where the judiciary has asserted an
inherent power to regulate the practice of law. This frequently claimed prerogative is
discussed in HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 3-5, and Comment, Control of the Unauthorized
Practice of Law: Scope of Inherent Judicial Power, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 162, 163 (1960).
Its exercise has led in the past to summary invalidations of various legislative efforts to
enlarge the class of activities permitted to nonlawyers. See, e.g., Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo.
467, 475, 101 S.W.2d 977, 981 (1937); Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of
Realtors, 41 Wash. 2d 697, 699-700, 251 P.2d 619, 621 (1952); West Virginia State Bar
Ass'n v. Early, 144 W. Va. 504, 533, 109 S.E.2d 420, 438 (1959). The only jurisdiction that
makes explicit provision for legislative regulation of the practice of law is New York.
HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 5.
240. To date there has been no showing of injury to the public deriving from lay
personalized or published divorce assistance. See pp. 113-14 supra. Negligence by lay
practitioners in other legal contexts has been held to afford a cause of action for
damages to injured clients or adversely affected third parties. E.g., Biakanja v. Irving, 49
Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (invalid will); Latson v. Eaton, 341 P.2d 247 (Okla. 1959)
(negligent preparation of legal documents); Hecomovich v. Nielson, 10 Wash. App. 563,
518 P.2d 1081 (1974) (real estate transaction). See Mattieligh v. Poe, 57 Wash. 2d 203, 204,
356 P.2d 328, 329 (1960) (adverting to legitimacy of such remedy).
States might also institute licensing programs which set ethical standards and define
permissible activities by lay divorce firms. Such a proposal has the support of the
California Divorce League, a consortium of lay advisors. Telephone Interview with Ruth
Ordesch, supra note 31. A detailed plan for oversight of lay divorce businesses is pre-
sented in Note, supra note 32, at 443-46.
241. Even assuming that low-cost lay assistance with form preparation is allowed to
proliferate, the question rhetorically posed by Llewellyn persists: "[W]hy continue paying
specialists for useless work"? Llewellyn, supra note 237, at 286. Or, as Marshall and May
phrased it:
The question still remains whether the character of the work actually required is
such as to justify the utilization of such a cumbersome machine with its concomitant
costs and fees: whether "judicial controversy" is a basis of divorce which is today
reasonably economical of time, effort, and money.
1 L. MARSHALL & G. MAY, THE DIVORCE COURT 283 (1932).
242. See p. 156 supra (lawyer estimates of clerical and waiting time expended on
average uncontested dissolution). The largely perfunctory character of the judicial
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A bifurcated system which employs hearings for contested divorces
and registration coupled with a waiting period for uncontested dis-
solutions has been implemented in Japan, Denmark, Norway, Iceland,
and Sweden,243 and has been advocated intermittently in the United
States.244 Its principal advantage is self-evident. Removing the in-
timidating procedures that attend dissolution would enable many
persons to do without any formal assistance-lay or legal-when
terminating a marriage, thereby decreasing costs and pricing divorce
within the means of all couples who desire it.
The empirical findings of this Project cannot purport to supply a
blueprint for the overhaul of the nation's divorce system. They do,
however, suggest directions in which future study and reform might
profitably proceed. Until institutional modifications occur, a demand
for kit and lay services for pro se plaintiffs will persist. The data here
compiled demonstrate no persuasive justification for enjoining such
assistance.
role is suggested by the extreme brevity of individual hearings, discussed at p. 129
supra. New Haven and Bridgeport judges seem to be typical in this regard. The vast
majority of domestic relations judges who responded to a poll by Quenstedt and Winkler
estimated that they rejected the proposed property dispositions, child support awards,
and custody allocations in less than 10% of their cases. J. QUENSTEDT &. C. WINKLER, supra
note 168, at unnumbered p.2.
243. In every year between 1948 and 1959, over 90% of Japanese divorces were ac-
complished by simple communication of the parties' agreement to a state registrar.
Custody arrangements are submitted to a family court for approval. Parties who fail to
reach a consensus on either divorce or its terms are heard first before a conciliation
committee of the family court and then, if disputes persist, before a district court.
M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 109-11.
In Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, all but a small minority of divorces are granted by
administrative agencies in "a well-established, inexpensive procedure." Id. at 131. The
Swedish practice is to grant dissolutions automatically upon the joint request of a
couple without children under 16. Where minor children are involved or a unilateral
application has been made, a divorce issues after a six-month waiting period. Sage,
Dissolution of the Family Under Swedish Law, 8 FAm. L.Q. 375 (1975).
244. See generally Goldberger, supra note 217; Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 8;
Llewellyn, supra note 237; Note, supra note 8.
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APPENDIX I
A. Suits Against Lay Divorce Enterprises
Price
Charged
Form for Kits Form
Preparation (and Ser- Preparation
Services vices if Plaintiff Kit Sale Services
State Offered? Available) in Suit Enjoined? Enjoined?
Alaska' No $50 Alaska Yes Not offered
Bar Ass'n
Florida2  No $20.80 Florida Yes Not offered
Bar Ass'n
California3  Yes $75 State Bar of No Yes
California
Colorado4  Yes $80-160 Colorado No Yes
Bar Ass'n
Florida 5  Yes $187 Florida Yes Yes
Bar Ass'n
MichiganG Yes $60-100 State Bar Unclear7  Yes
of Michigan
Minnesota 8  Yes N.A. Minnesota State Yes Yes
Bar Ass'n
New YorkG Yes $100-125 New York No Yes
Attorney
General's Office
Nevada1°  Yes $75 State Bar Yes Yes
of Nevada
Oregon"1  Yes $40-55 Oregon State No Yes
Bar Ass'n
1. Alaska Bar Ass'n v. Foster, C.A. No. 73-161 (Super. Ct. Alas., Oct. 29, 1973), reported
in Alaska Bar Ass'n v. Foster, et al., 38 UNAUTH. P.Ac. NEws 75, 75-80 (1974); telephone
interview with Randall J. Weddle, Esq., attorney for plaintiffs (Aug. 4, 1976) (notes on
file with Yale Law Journal).
2. Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d 683 (1974); letter to authors from William B.
Wiley, Esq., Assistant Staff Counsel for the Florida Bar (July 26, 1976) (on file with
Yale Law Journal).
3. State Bar v. Corey, No. 157163 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Bernadino County, Oct. 11,
1973), reported in California Restrains "No-Fault Divorce Consultation Service," 38
UNAUTH. PRAc. NEWs 44, 44-52 (1974).
4. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Bratt, No. C50833 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Denver, Feb. ,1975), re-
ported in Colorado Bar Association Starts Suit Against Lay Divorce Specialists, 39 UN-
AUTH. Ppoc. NEvs 87-91 (1975); telephone interview with Alex Keller, Esq., attorney for
plaintiffs (July 19, 1976) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
5. Florida Bar Ass'n v. American Legal & Business Forms, 274 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1973).
6. State Bar v. Graham, No. 72-218-571-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct., Dec. 18, 1972), cited in
More on Do-It-Yourself Divorce Kits and Services, 37 UNAUTH. PRAc. NEws 59, 66-67
(1973); telephone interview with John B. Lisa, Esq., Past Chairman, Michigan State Bar
Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (June 17, 1976) (notes on file with Yale Law
Journal).
7. In pertinent part, the Michigan injunction forbids defendants to "furnis[h] or
offe[r] to furnish kits, forms or documents, with assistance in their completion or execu-
tion, to persons seeking to dissolve a marital relationship." State Bar v. Graham, No.
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72-218-571-CZ (Cir. Ct. Mich., Dec. 18, 1972), reported in More on Do-It-Yourself Divorce
Kits and Services, 37 UNAUTH. PAc. NEWS 59, 66 (1973).
8. Minnesota State Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Reform, Inc., No. 396447 (Dist. Ct. Minn.,
April 18, 1975), reported in Minnesota Bar Wins Sweeping Victory Against a Lay
Practitioner of Divorce Law, 39 UNAUTH. PRAc. NEWS 187, 188-93 (1975).
9. State v. Winder, 42 App. Div. 2d 1039, 348 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1973).
10. State Bar v. Brandon (Nev. Dist. Ct. Clark County, Aug. 23, 1972), reported in
Nevada Divorce, 37 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEWS 32, 37-42 (1973).
11. Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913 (Or. App. 1975).
B. The following is a list of all other kits and services known to the
Project authors.
Kits Price
C. ALLEN, HOW To GEr A NEW YORK DIVORCE FOR UNDER $100 (1975) (authored by
layman). NA
DIVORCE REFORM INC., Do YOUR OWN DIVORCE IN MAINE (undated) (authored by
panel of laymen and attorneys). S2.95
PRO SE DISSOLUTION GROUP, PRO SE DIssoLtrrION KIT (1975) (Connecticut) (au-
thored by laymen). 4.00
C. SHERMAN, HOW TO Do YOUR OWN DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA (1975) (authored by
attorney). 4.95
D. WILLIAMS & P. BLACK, THE S27 DIVORCE (1972) (Colorado) (coauthored by
attorney). 5.50
Wisconsin kit, title unknown, described in More On Do-It-Yourself Divorce Kits
and Services, 37 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEWS 59, 71-72 (1973). 50.00
Services
California Divorce League, consortium of 21 walk-in offices, described in Wall 60.00-
St. J., Sept. 3, 1976, at 1, col. 1, and note 25 supra. 75.00
Minnesota agency, name unknown, described in More On Do-It-Yourself Divorce
Kits and Services, 37 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEWS 59, 67 (1973). 115.00
Seattle Women's Divorce Cooperative, described in WOMEN'S LEGAL CENTER OF
SAN FRANCISCO, GETTING OUT: A COLLECTIVE EXPERIENCE IN SELF-HELP DIVORCE
(1974). NA
Wisconsin women's group, name unknown, described in More On Do-It-Yourself
Divorce Kits and Services, 37 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEWS 70-72. 2.00
Women's Legal Center of San Francisco, described in WOMEN'S LEGAL CENTER OF
SAN FRANCISCO, GETTING OUT: A COLLECTIVE EXPERIENCE IN SELF-HELP DIVORCE
(1974). 20.00
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APPENDIX 2
Data Recorded From Divorce Files
I. Interval between filing of complaint and claim for hearing.
2. Date of dissolution decree.
3. Grounds for dissolution.
4. Duration of marriage.
5. Number of minor children.
6. Plaintiff's claims for relief.
7. Awards made to plaintiff (type and composition).
8. Name and address of plaintiff's attorney.
9. Whether defendant was represented by an attorney.
10. Plaintiff's income and assets, if listed.
1I. Defendant's income and assets, if listed.
12. Whether plaintiff was a recipient of state welfare assistance.
13. Whether the following were included in file:
a. Affidavit regarding custody of minor children.
b. Stipulation of irretrievable breakdown.
c. List of witnesses.
d. Service by publication or registered mail.
e. Military affidavit.
f. Motion to waive fees and costs for indigent plaintiff.
g. Other motions.
14. Detailed summary of contents of separation agreement.
APPENDIX 3
Telephone Interview Form For Clients
1. How long was the first interview that you had with your lawyer after
you decided to get a divorce?
2. Between that first interview and your court hearing at the end, roughly
how many times did you talk with your lawyer?
Personal interviews ........... Phone conversations ...........
3. Had you and your spouse worked out an agreement on how to divide
your property before you first went to see your lawyer? L] Yes ] No
A. (If Yes) Did your lawyer suggest changes, or did your agreement
remain the same?
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B. (If No) Did your lawyer help you to negotiate an agreement, or
did you later work things out between yourselves?
4. Before you first went to see your lawyer, did you and your spouse reach
agreement on alimony (and child support)? ] Yes [] No
A. (If Yes) Did your lawyer suggest changes, or did your agreement
remain the same?
B. (If No) Did your lawyer help you to negotiate an agreement, or
did you later work things out between yourselves?
5. Were custody and visitation settled between you and your spouse be-
fore you first went to see your lawyer? [] Yes R No
A. (If Yes) Did your lawyer suggest changes, or did your agreement
remain the same?
B. (If No) Did your lawyer help you to negotiate an agreement, or
did you later work things out between yourselves?
6. Did your lawyer prepare a written separation agreement which was
signed by you and your spouse? [ Yes [] No
7. As part of his work in getting your divorce, did your lawyer give you
any advice on tax matters involved in the settlement? [] Yes [] No
8. Was there a house involved? ] Yes [- No
9. Did the lawyer help you in any other ways?
10. Did your lawyer at any time suggest or advise reconciliation between
you and your spouse? [] Yes [- No
11. Did you receive personal counseling about the divorce from any
source? RJ Yes ] No Source (s):
12. How much did the lawyer charge you for handling your divorce?
13. Do you feel it was a fair price for the services performed?
14. Was your spouse represented by an attorney?
15. Duration of marriage ............ Length of separation ............
Age ............ Education: Own ............ Spouse ............
Income (joint) .......... Occupation at time of divorce: .......
Own ............ Spouse ............
16. Do you have any additional comments?
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APPENDIX 4
Lawyer Questionnaire
1. Circle the category which best describes your law practice:
A. Legal Aid B. Single Practitioner
C. 1-3 Partners D. 4+ Partners
2. For how many years have you been handling divorce (marital dissolu-
tion) cases?
3. Roughly how many divorces did you personally handle for plaintiffs in
the last year? ............ For defendants? ............
4. Of the uncontested* divorces which you have handled for plaintiffs
since the enactment of the 1973 Connecticut Dissolution of Marriage
Act:
What percentage involve minor children?
A. 0.20% B. 20-40% C. 40-60% D. 60-80% E. 80-100%
What percentage (of those involving minor children) involve sub-
stantive disputes over child support which require you to negotiate
an agreement?
A. 0.20% B. 2040% C. 40-60% D. 60-80% E. 80-100%
What percentage (of those involving minor children) involve sub-
stantive disputes over custody and/or visitation which require you
to negotiate an agreement?
A. 0.20% B. 20-40% C. 40-60% D. 60-80% E. 80-100%
What percentage (of all the uncontested divorces) involve substantive
disputes over alimony which require you to negotiate an agreement?
A. 0.20% B. 20-40% C. 40-60% D. 60-80% E. 80-100%
What percentage (of all the uncontested divorces) involve substantive
disputes over division of property which require you to negotiate an
agreement?
A. 0.20% B. 20-40% C. 40-60% D. 60-80% E. 80-100%
What percentage (of all the uncontested divorces) involve a written
separation agreement?
A. 0.207 B. 20-40% C. 40-60% D. 60-80% E. 80-100%
5. Please estimate the average amount of time spent completing the follow-
ing, where necessary, when representing the plaintiff in an uncontested
divorce action. In some categories, estimates are requested both for
your time and for that spent by supervised secretaries and parapro-
fessionals (e.g. typing, filing, research). Please record your time in hours
or fractions of hours, and keep in mind that each category refers to
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uncontested actions handled since the enactment of the 1973 Connecti-
cut Dissolution of Marriage Act.
Initial client interview ..............
Preparing complaint: Your time ............
Supervised employee time ............
Securing waiver of court fees for indigent plaintiffs:
Your time ............
Supervised employee time ............
[] Never been necessary
Procuring service by registered mail upon absent defendant:
Your time ............
Supervised employee time ............
LI Never been necessary
Procuring service by publication upon absent defendant:
Your time, preparation ............
Your time, court: arguing motion ......... ; waiting .........
,Supervised employee time, preparation ............
LI Never been necessary
Motion for alimony/child support/counsel fees pendente lite:
Your time, preparation ............
Your time, court: arguing motion .......... ; waiting ..........
Supervised employee time, preparation ............
Drawing up financial affidavit for plaintiff:
Your time, preparation ............
Supervised employee time, preparation ............
Negotiations with defendant (if defendant has no lawyer) .........
Negotiations with defendant's lawyer ............
Preparing military affidavit: Your time ............
Supervised employee time ...........
Preparing client for trial ............
Court time, dissolution hearing: Presenting case ............
W aiting ............
Preparing judgment for certification:
Your time ............
Supervised employee time ............
Other (please specify):
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6. On the average, when representing plaintiffs in uncontested actions,
how often do you talk to your client between the time of the initial
interview and the final dissolution hearing?
No. of personal interviews ...... ; No. of phone conversations ......
7. What percentage of the dissolutions which you have initiated were
dismissed for failure to prosecute, or withdrawn for any reason?
A. 0-20% B. 20-40% C. 40-60% D. 60-80% E. 80-100%
8. In what percentage of your uncontested actions is it necessary to
threaten post-decree legal action on behalf of your client?
A. 0-207o B. 20-40% C. 40-60% D. 60-80% E. 80-100%
9. In what percentage of your uncontested actions do you actually file
post-decree motions on behalf of your client?
A. 0-20% B. 20-40% C. 40-60% D. 60-80% E. 80-100%
10. What do you see as the lawyer's most important functions in an uncon-
tested divorce action?
By "uncontested" are meant those cases which culminate in an uncontested hearing.
APPENDIX 5
A. Telephone Interview Form for Pro Se Plaintiffs
1. At what stage are you in your divorce proceeding?
2. Why did you decide to represent yourself?
Money: ] Primary [ Secondary
3. Did you talk to a lawyer before deciding to represent yourself?
El Yes F1 No
4. How did you hear about the divorce kit?
5. Did you have any major difficulties using the kit? nj Yes EI No
6. Apart from the kit, did you have any difficulty representing yourself?
El Yes n No
7. What would you have done if no kit had existed?
8. Would you have delayed your divorce? E] Yes LI No
9. In handling the legal action, did you get any assistance from anyone?
] Yes nI No If so, from whom was it obtained, and could you
have proceeded without it?
10. Would legal counseling from an attorney have been helpful?
[] Yes E No
11. Would a lawyer's assistance in working out a property settlement have
been useful? ] Yes [- No
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12. Would any personal counseling have been helpful? E] Yes [ No
If so, about what and from whom?
13. Did you have any problems in getting the cooperation of clerks?
] Yes Rj No If so, of what sort?
14. Did you have any problems in getting the cooperation of judges?
E] Yes F1 No If so, of what sort?
15. Were you or your spouse influenced by the existence of the kit in your
decision not to contest your divorce? E] Yes E- No
16. Do you think your spouse wanted to get a lawyer but didn't because
you were using the kit? [] Yes [] No
17. Did you and your spouse agree in advance to procure the dissolution
with the kit, or did you make the decision on your own?
EI Agreed in advance . Own initiative
18. Did your divorce involve child custody? ] Yes [I No
19. Did your divorce involve a written property settlement? El Yes l No
20. If no, would you have felt more comfortable with one? E] Yes ] No
21. At the time you filed the complaint, were your spouse's whereabouts
known to you? ] Yes ] No [- Spouse in Conn.
22. Duration of marriage ............ Length of separation ...........
Age ............ Education: Own ............ Spouse ............
Income (joint) ............ Occupation at time of divorce:
Own ............ Spouse ............
23. Do you have any additional comments?
B. Telephone Interview Form for Kit Purchasers Who Had Not
Commenced Pro Se Actions
1. Why did you initially decide to represent yourself?
Money: ] Primary [] Secondary
2. Have you definitely decided not to use the kit, or are you still un-
decided? ] Definitely not ] Undecided
3. Why did you decide not to proceed further with the kit?
A. KIT RELATED
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--- Felt kit was too complex, hard to understand
---- No one was available to answer questions
-Wanted a lawyer's advice
-Other
B. PROCESS RELATED
-Couldn't resolve issues concerning property division
-. Couldn't resolve issues re alimony, child support, custody
-Notsure about wanting divorce
-. Too busy to do myself
-. Too much hassle to do myself; not worth time, effort
--- Apprehensive about proceeding pro se
Not sure what to expect
Couldn't do it without moral support
.----No reason to get divorce now
.-.---Needed divorce quickly
-Other:
4. Were there any unresolved questions concerning alimony, child sup-
port, custody, or division of property? E] Yes (coded above) ] No
5. Would you prefer having a lawyer handling the action?
MI Yes MI No Why?
6. Do you think you would have proceeded with the kit if:
A. It had included information about your situation? M Yes [ No
B. It had been easier to understand? M] Yes F1 No
C. Assistance had been available? [j Yes L1 No If so, of what sort?
7. At what point did you decide not to use the kit?
8. Did you receive any advice encouraging or discouraging you from using
the kit? L- Yes nI No
9. How did you hear about the kit?
10. Duration of marriage ............ Length of separation ............
Age ............ Education: Own ............ Spouse ............
Income (joint) ............ Occupation at time of divorce:
Own ............ Spouse ............
11. Do you have any additional comments?
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APPENDIX 6
Selected Connecticut Divorce Forms
A. Connecticut Practice Book Form 396 (Dissolution complaint)
Complaint for Dissolution of Marriage, with Custody
of Children, and Alimony
1. The plaintiff (whose maiden name was Mary Roe) and the defendant
intermarried January 1, 1950, at
in the state (or country) of
2. The plaintiff (or defendant) has resided continuously in this state
for at least twelve months next preceding the date of the filing of this com-
plaint.
Or: The plaintiff (or defendant) removed into this state on the
day of 19 , and has resided continu-
ously therein since said date and the cause of dissolution of marriage set
forth in this complaint arose after said removal.
Or: The plaintiff (or defendant) was domiciled in this state at the
time of said marriage and before instituting this complaint had returned to
this state with the intention of permanently remaining.
Or: (if none of the above jurisdictional bases exists): The plaintiff
(or defendant) has resided continuously in this state since (insert date).
3. The marriage has broken down irretrievably.
Or: The parties have lived apart for a continuous period of at least
the eighteen months immediately prior to the service of the complaint by
reason of incompatibility and there is no reasonable prospect that they will
be reconciled.
[examples of fault-based allegations omitted]
4. The plaintiff and the defendant have two minor children, issue
of their marriage, John Doe, born and Mary Doe,
born , whose custody was on
awarded to by order of
court (naming it), or the responsibility for whose support was on
by order of court (naming it), placed upon
of New Britain, Connecticut, or over whose persons on
by judgment of (name of court) of
was appointed guardian.
5. No other minor children have been born to the (plaintiff wife)
(defendant wife) since the date of the marriage of the parties.
Or: The following other minor children have been born to the (plain-
tiff wife) (defendant wife) since the date of the marriage of the parties:
Richard Doe, born , and Mary Doe, born
whose custody was on
awarded to by order of
court (naming it) or the
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responsibility for whose support was on by order
of court (naming it), placed upon
of or over whose persons on
by judgment of court (naming it) of
, was appointed guardian.
6. The address of the plaintiff is . The
plaintiff's social security number is , and the plaintiff
was born on . The address of the defendant
is , the defendant's social security
number is , and the defendant was born on
7. (If the state of Connecticut is contributing or has contributed to
the support or maintenance of a party or child of said party such fact
should be stated in the complaint and a copy thereof served on the attorney
general in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 80. Although the attor-
ney general shall be a party to such cases, he need not be named in the writ
of summons or summoned to appear.)
8. The defendant owns real and personal estate to the value of $15,000,
or, The defendant has an income of 58000 a year.
The plaintiff claims:
1. A dissolution of marriage (or a legal separation).
2. The custody of both the children.
3. Alimony.
4. An assignment of the defendant's estate, described in exhibit A
attached hereto, pursuant to the provisions of Gen. Stat., § 46-51.
5. That her name be changed to Mary Roe (to be used in a dissolu-
tion of marriage case only).
(See Gen. Stat., §§ 46-32(c), 46-35, 46-63.)
(Amended June 25, 1973, to take effect Sept. 4, 1973; amended June 24,
1974, to take effect Oct. 1, 1974; amended June 7, 1976, to take effect Oct.
1, 1976.)
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B. Form JD(COLP)-6001 (Connecticut Practice Book Form 379A)
(Financial Affidavit)
Sworn Financial Statement
LOCKT V"0 ......................................... SUPEMSOR COURT AT ...............................




Plaintiff 0 Defendant 5
L INCOME (provide pertinent records)
A. Income From Principal Emplo.ment: Gross Wages $ - k. Net Wages $ ok.
(weekly average, not less than 13 weeks)
Itemize Deductions:
. vi. _________ $ cok.
.__________ P c.__________ $ ca.
Total Deductions $ wak.
B. All Other Ilneome (including in-kuind comppnsation, gratuities, rents, interest, dividends, pension, etc.)
1. Sources of Income: (identify)
2. Income: ........... (Toal froe, Secton B-1) Gros Earning, $ _ w. Nct Earnings $ wk.
3. Ded hetions: (itemize)
-h. _.$ .
,$ ca._________ S co.
Total Deductions t -wk.




Value (estimate) $ Mortgage $ Equity $.
Other: Address
Value (estimate) A Mortgage S Equity $
B. Motor Vehicles
Year __ Model Volue $ Lon Balance $ Equity $
Year __ Model Value $ Loan Balance $ - Equity $
Other Personal Property (describe, list value)
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a Stocks, Bonads, Mutual Funds (list company, number of shares, value)
Total Value $
P. Insuraneo (excla e childrca)




Total Cash Value (lees loans) 8
0. All Otber Assets
Total Value A
HL TOTAL ALL As, v ......................................................... (Total A-G) $
I. Lcumarrms
A. Date Amount of Debt Source of Debt Balance Due Weekly Payment
-- ._ $. - 8 - o8--
$._ __ _ $. $
___ . C___ $ 8.
___ C__ $ $s___
___ C_ _ _$ 8.
TOTAi. Waxny PAyacosep ON Lioununu1s $
TOat LoABea $
IV. BA sic ExPEsm (Weekly)
1. Seat or Mortgago (incl. prop.
eaty taxes & too.)
Z Utilities telcodlg heating)
3. Fod
4. Payment on recurront debts
5. Medtcal and dental espenoes






A. Total Weely Net Income (Alt Sources)
B. Total Cosh Value of All Assets
0. Total Liabilities
D. Total Weekly Expenses
8. Imurance Premiums 8
- 9. Transportation (including auto
S insurance) 8









I hereby certify that the forcgotnj statement is accurate to the best of my knowledge and that I can, if requested, submit documen-
tation for all ase, liabilities, .an cxpeases listed abave.
Sworne and 8ubscribed to before me
N-etary Public-Commissio e of Superior Court
Date
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C. Form JD(COLP)-6002 (Claim for Uncontested Hearing)
Doc rr No ......................................... SuPa uos COURT AT .................................
PLAINTIF ......................................... DATE ..............................................
V.
DEFENDANT ........................................
Claim For Family Relations Uncontested List
I hereby claim the above matter for the uncontested list and certify:
1. ( ) This case is uncontested.
2. ( ) All statutory residence requirements have been met.
3. ( ) All statutory stays have expired, including a ninety day stay from the return day and any concilia-
tion stay.
4. Complete if the opposing party appears.
There is no amended complaint, cross complaint, or amended cross complaint on which a decree is
claimed.
or
There is an amended complaint - cross complaint - amended cross complaint on which a decree is
claimed but (cross off whichever is inapplicable) - the written consent of the opposing party is
endorsed thereon or endorsed on a separate instrument - twenty days have elapsed from the filing of
such amended complaint - cross complaint - amended cross complaint.
Notice of intention to file this claim was served on the opposing party not less than ten days prior
to the date hereof.
or
Notice of intention to file this claim has been waived by written stipulation of the parties.
5. Complete if the opposing party does not appear.
There is no amended complaint, cross complaint, or amended cross complaint which cets forth a cause
of action or claim for relief not in the original complaint.
or
There is an amended complaint - cross complaint - amended cross complaint which sets forth a cause
of action or claim for relief not in the original complaint but twenty days have elapsed from the filing
of such amended complaint - cross complaint - amended cress complaint
................................. ... ... ................................
(Individ"a Atfencij Sigring Claim)
on behalf of (if applicable)
.... .... ..  .... .... ... .... ....P .............. ..... .............................
(Firm, Profeasionai Cor5,oalie or OfWtc
I hereby stipulate to waive prior ten days notice of the filing of this claim and consent to any amended or substitute
complaint - cross complaint - amendment to the complaint or cross complaint filed within the last twenty days.
...................................... .............. ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.n......a. Atto..........................rney Signing Claim)
on behalf of (if applicable)
.................... ....................................................
(Finn, Professional Corperalie er Oflc)
JD(COLP)--6002
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D. Connecticut Practice Book Annotated Form 396.25'
(Affidavit that defendant is not in the military services)
MILITARY AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
COUNTY OF } ss:
Personally appeared who made oath:
1. That she has had occasion to speak with the defendant over the last
thirty days.
2. That she is satisfied that he resides at 00 South Street, Greenwich,
Connecticut.
3. That in her opinion he is not presently within the military or naval
service.
[L.S.]
Subscribed and sworn to this
day of , 19-, before me.
Commissioner of the Superior Court
E. Connecticut Practice Book Annotated Form 396.92
(Affidavit regarding custody of minor children)
AFFIDAVIT RE CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
COUNTY OF ss:
I, the complaining party in the above entitled action seeking custody of
the minor(s), hereby aver that there is no proceeding pending in any other
court affecting the custody of such mitior(s) or any of them.
Subscribed and sworn to before me on the above date.
Commissioner of the Superior Court
Reprinted by permission of the West Publishing Company from the Connecticut
Practice Book Annotated (1975 Supplement).
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F. Form JDSR 214
(Decree form used when defendant has not filed an appearance)
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE .TUDGMEN'T - Defaot





Present Heon. , Judge.
JUDGMENT
This action, by writ, and complaint, claiming a dissolution of the marriage of the parties and other relief,
as on file, came to this Court on
and thence to
the present time, when the plaintiff appeared to prosecute said complaint, the defendant having made default
of appearance.
The Court finds (1) that said writ and complaint 'was duly served on the defendant, and (2) that the
defendant is not now nor within thirty days last prior hereto has been in the military or naval service of the
United States, an affidavit re military service having been filed.
The Court, having heard the plaintiff, further finds the following:
1. The wife, by the name of
was lawfully married to the husband on
at
2. The resided continuously in this State twelve months next before the
date of the filing of the complaint or next preceding the date of this decree, and all statutory stays have expired.
3.
4. The plaintiff and defendant have minor children, issue of said marriage, to wit:
5. other minor children have been born to the wife since the date of marriage.
Whereupon it is adjudged that the marriage of the parties to this action be and it is hereby dissolved and
they are each hereby declared to be single and unmarried, and that the care, custody and education of said
minor children is hereby committed to the subject to the right of reasonable visitation
in the
And that the pay to the as alimony,
and for the support of each
of said minor children,
Said support and alimony orders to be effective on notice to the defendant and filing thereof.
................................................. . .............................. Judge
County of
State of Connecticut s
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original judgment in the herein named cause, as
on file and of record appears.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and the seal of said Court on
Clerk of the Superior Court.
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G. Mimeographed form used by New Haven Superior Court clerk's
office to indicate errors made in filed forms
CLERK, SUPERIOR COURT
235 CHURCH STREET
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT 06510
THE ENCLOSED PAPERS ARE RETURNED FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASONS:
) . Papers are not signed by individual attorney; does not include
address of attorney. Papers not punched; insufficient margins. PB
Sec. 79.
( ) 2. Certification needed PB Sec. 80.
( ) 3. Cannot be claimed for trial list. Issues not closed as to:
( ) 4. Already claimed for trial list.
( ) 5. Comply with PB Sec. 205 as amended September 4, 1974 (Privilege
of Recall).
) 6. Pleading not closed. Case not subject to Motion for Reference. PB
Sec. 353 Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 51-182M.
( ) 7. Case discontinued by Court. Case withdrawn.
( ) 8. Wrong Court or wrong case number.
( ) 9. Jury claim for six already on file.
( ) 10. Our records do not disclose a case captioned or returnable as the
enclosed.
( ) 11. Comply with PB Sec. 154, 168 Re proposed order.
( ) 12. Rule to show cause necessary unless you indicate to us that op-
posing counsel has agreed to appear.
( ) 13. Brief required (PB Sec. 220).
( ) 14. File short calendar claim in ten days if no other pleading is filed.
(PB Sec. 283).
( ) 15. No record of your appearance in this case.
( ) 16. No affidavit filed by either counsel certifying attempts to resolve
differences; (PB Sec. 168 as amended).
) 17. Motion to place on uncontested list not proper. PB Sec. 377 re-
pealed effective October 1, 1974. See PB Sec. 394.
) 18. Not proper claim for uncontested list. See PB Sec. 394.
RE: PB Sec. 394 (b) Notice of intent to claim to uncontested list
PB Sec. 394 (c) (4) Ninety days has not elapsed from return
day.
PB Sec. 394 (c) (5) Indicate on claim form if complaint has
been amended.
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( ) 19. This matter has already been set down for a future hearing date.
( ) 20. Not a short calendar matter. File a claim for privileged court jury
trial list (green slip) PB Sec. 213 (18) See 148 Conn. 435 at 439.
( ) 21. Motion to amend must have signed original of amendment at-
tached to motion. PB 132 (c) effective September 15, 1975.
( ) 22. Motion to amend granted Amended pleading not
on file. See PB Sec. 132 (a).
( ) 23. Motion for disclosure is a pleading. No record of your compliance
with motion on file. See 131 Conn. 266.
( ) 24. Disclosure filed . Is this a motion for non-suit de-
fault for failure to fully disclose as to certain paragraphs?
( ) 25. Appearance does not comply with PB Sec. 42 (as amended effective
November 1, 1974) RE:
Juris number, mailing address, 8 " wide paper, signed by in-
dividual with his own name.
Does not state if appearance is in place of or in addition to ap-
pearance on file for attorney:
By
Assistant Clerk
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